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Toward Coherent Federal                        
Oversight of Medicine 
PATRICIA J. ZETTLER* 
ABSTRACT 
The conventional wisdom in U.S. health law and policy holds that states 
regulate medical practice—the activities of physicians and other health 
care professionals—while the federal government regulates medical 
products.  But relying on states as the principal regulators of medical 
practice has, at times, driven law and policy in directions that are problematic 
from a public health perspective, as demonstrated by a deadly 2012 
outbreak of fungal meningitis that was linked to a primarily state-
regulated practice known as drug compounding.  This Article argues that 
the federalism concerns underlying the conventional wisdom are misplaced.  
It demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the federal 
government is deeply entangled in regulating medical practice, and such 
federal regulation is lawful.  After examining the goals of federalism 
within the context of medicine, this Article proposes an alternate paradigm 
for guiding decisions about when the federal government should be 
involved in overseeing medicine: Congress and administrative agencies 
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should exert federal authority when medical practice contributes to a 
national public health problem that states cannot address.  This framework 
is applied to one pressing public health problem to which medical practice 
contributes—antibiotic resistance—to show how the framework could be 
implemented.  Federal oversight of medical practice under this framework 
would be more principled and transparent than the scheme of federal 
control that is in place today. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2012, an outbreak of fungal meningitis sickened 751 and 
killed 64 people in the United States.1  The outbreak was traced to tainted 
steroid injections made by the New England Compounding Center, a 
pharmacy in Massachusetts.2  The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) concluded that the tainted drugs reached approximately 
14,000 patients in 23 states,  which, combined with the number of fatalities 
and sickened patients, made this outbreak one of the worst U.S. public 
health disasters in recent history.3 
In the Congressional hearings that followed, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) was criticized for failing to prevent this outbreak.4  
Yet the FDA’s authority to prevent the outbreak was unclear because the 
tainted drugs were made through a practice known as “drug compounding,”5 
rather than through traditional drug manufacturing.6  That is, the FDA 
 
 1.  See Multi-State Outbreak of Fungal Meningitis and Other Infections, CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Oct. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Multi-State Outbreak], 
http://www.cdc.gov/hai/outbreaks/meningitis.html [http://perma.cc/4SUD-6YSM]. 
 2.  See id. 
 3.  See Pharmacy Compounding: Implications of the 2012 Meningitis Outbreak: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 112th Cong. 1–
4 (2012) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin, Chairman, S. Comm. on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions) [hereinafter 2012 HELP Compounding Hearing], available at  
http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=5f5def0d-5056-a032-5297-eab57634d209 
[http://perma.cc/9KQF-9AQ3]; Multi-State Outbreak, supra note 1.  In fact, in 2014, the 
owners of the New England Compounding Center were arrested and indicted on 131 
counts, including charges of racketeering, mail fraud, conspiracy, and second-degree 
murder.  See Jess Bidgood & Sabrina Tavernise, Pharmacy Executives Face Murder 
Charges in Meningitis Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at A23. 
 4.  See, e.g., Rob Stein, Lawmakers Clash with FDA over Meningitis Outbreak, 
NPR.ORG (Nov. 14, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/11/14/165 
156555/congressmen-clash-with-fda-over-meningitis-outbreak [http://perma.cc/N2PK-PYE5]. 
 5.  Drug compounding involves a medical practitioner combining, mixing, or 
altering drug ingredients to create an individualized medication for a patient.  See 2012 
HELP Compounding Hearing, supra note 3 (testimony of Margaret A. Hamburg, 
Commissioner, Food & Drug Admin.); Kevin Outterson, Regulating Compounding 
Pharmacies after NECC, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1969, 1971 (2012). 
 6.  See 2012 HELP Compounding Hearing, supra note 3.  Before 1992 the FDA 
generally declined to regulate drug compounding.  In 1992, concerned about the risks of 
large-scale compounding, the FDA announced a policy describing when it considered 
compounding to be within its purview.  Among the activities the FDA identified as 
triggering regulation was advertising compounding services.  In 1997, Congress added 
section 503A to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to codify the FDA’s 1992 
policy.  In 2002, the Supreme Court invalidated the advertising provisions of section 503A 
ZETTLER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/27/2015  1:55 PM 
 
430 
lacked clear authority because the contaminated drugs were made by a 
pharmacy, an activity that falls within the “practice of medicine”7 
traditionally regulated by state law, rather than by a federally regulated 
drug manufacturer. 
This division of labor between the states and the federal government 
will be unsurprising to those familiar with U.S. health law and policy.  
Arising in part from courts’ longstanding recognition that the states are 
authorized to regulate medical practice pursuant to their police powers,8 
the conventional wisdom among courts, lawmakers, and administrative 
agencies is that states regulate medical practice, while the federal 
government regulates medical products.  For example, in United States v. 
Evers, the Fifth Circuit explained that, while the FDA “was obviously 
intended to control the availability of drugs for prescribing by 
physicians,” it “was not intended to regulate the practice of medicine.”9  
Similarly, in United States v. Regenerative Sciences, LLC, Judge Rosemary 
M. Collyer of the D.C. District Court noted that the “Defendants state[d] 
that Congress has left the practice of medicine to the States to regulate, 
[and] FDA does not disagree with these principles.”10 
The discourse following the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak demonstrated 
the endurance of these ideas.  Despite the public health stakes illustrated 
by the outbreak, members of Congress continued to express concern about 
intruding on state regulation of medical practice when designing the Drug 
Quality and Security Act of 2013, which was enacted in part to remedy 
the FDA’s limited authority over compounding pharmacies.11  Senator 
 
in a decision that left the validity of the rest of section 503A in question.  See Thompson 
v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002).  At the time of the 2012 fungal meningitis 
outbreak, there was a circuit split regarding the severability of the unconstitutional 
advertising provisions of section 503A, and consequently, the extent of the FDA’s authority 
over compounding was quite unclear.  See Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 
387 (5th Cir. 2008); W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090, 1096–98 (9th Cir. 
2001); Outterson, supra note 5, at 1969–71. 
 7.  This Article uses the phrase “practice of medicine” broadly to include the 
practice of pharmacy, the practice of dentistry, and other health-related practices that states 
traditionally regulated.  Thus, medical practitioners in this Article include physicians, 
dentists, pharmacists, and other professionals authorized to independently practice medicine. 
 8.  See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122–23, 128 (1889). 
 9.  643 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 10.  878 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 741 F.3d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 
see also Richard Epstein, The FDA’s Misguided Regulation of Stem-Cell Procedures: How 
Administrative Overreach Blocks Medical Innovation, LEGAL POL’Y REP., Sept. 2013, at 
2, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/lpr_17.pdf [http://perma.cc/8245-
EERC] (describing the regulation of medical practice as distinct from the FDA’s regulation 
of drugs and biologics). 
 11.  Title I of the Drug Quality and Security Act addresses drug compounding, while 
Title II is intended to improve the security of the drug supply chain.  See Drug Quality and 
Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (2013). 
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Tom Coburn, speaking in support of the new law, emphasized that it 
properly left practice-of-medicine issues to the states “so the art and science 
of medicine would not be impeded by FDA.”12  Additionally, the new law 
left some significant holes in federal authority, such as making federal 
licensing for large-scale compounding pharmacies optional rather than 
mandatory.13  It appears that Congress made licensing optional because it 
could not agree on what constitutes traditional compounding, which would 
be left to state regulation, versus drug manufacturing, which would be 
subject to federal requirements.14  In other words, Congress could not 
agree on where to draw the line between the practice of medicine and the 
manufacturing of a drug product.  The gaps in federal authority resulting 
from this impasse may leave the United States at risk for another public 
health disaster.15 
Although concerns about federal interference with the practice of 
medicine often arise in the FDA context, the FDA’s jurisdiction is but one 
area among many in health law and policy that have been affected by these 
concerns.  Concerns about federal control of medical practice—including 
legal concerns about the limits of the federal government’s constitutional 
and statutory authority over medicine, as well as policy concerns about 
the wisdom of federal control—have played a role in shaping healthcare 
reform,16 controlled substances policy,17 Medicare,18 and the oversight of 
medical practitioners’ business practices,19 among other things.  Likewise, 
federal agencies other than the FDA, including the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services,20 the Drug Enforcement Administration,21 and the 
 
 12.  159 CONG. REC. S8029-06 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2013) (statement of Sen. Coburn). 
 13.  See Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, § 102, 127 
Stat. 587, 592–93 (2013); Kevin Outterson, The Drug Quality and Security Act—Mind the 
Gaps, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97, 98 (2014) [hereinafter Outterson, DQSA]. 
 14.  See Outterson, DQSA, supra note 13, at 98. 
 15.  Cf. id (“[If] another tragedy similar to the one involving the NECC is to be 
avoided, additional action [beyond the Drug Quality and Security Act] is needed.”). 
 16.  See infra notes 76–82, 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See infra notes 54, 171–73 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See infra notes 78, 85 and accompanying text. 
 19.  See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
 20.  See, e.g., Coll. of Am. Pathologists v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 859, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 21.  See, e.g., Jane C. Ballantyne, Regulation of Opioid Prescribing: Over-Regulation 
Compromises Doctors’ Ability to Treat Pain, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 811, 811–12 (2007). 
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Federal Trade Commission,22 have been criticized on both legal and 
policy grounds for exerting authority over medical practice. 
But these federalism concerns over the practice of medicine are 
misplaced.  State regulation arose at a time when the practice of medicine 
was largely unregulated and quite provincial—medicine was dominated by 
unlicensed solo practitioners who treated patients with self-made remedies, 
local differences in practice standards were to be expected, and courts 
viewed the federal government’s commerce powers as quite limited.23  
While the traditional view that the federal government should not regulate 
medical practice may have been reasonable in those circumstances, this 
view does not account for advances in technology and scientific understanding 
that have changed medicine into a national field with a recognized impact 
on the national public health.  Moreover, the traditional view fails to 
acknowledge the ways in which the federal government currently does 
control medical practice, as well as the porousness of the practice-products 
distinction.  Consequently, determining whether an activity constitutes medical 
practice is not a useful way to decide whether the states or the federal 
government should regulate that particular activity. 
Instead, when deciding whether to exert federal authority, Congress and 
federal administrative agencies should consider whether the activity 
causes or contributes to a national public health problem that states cannot 
address.  This framework proposes a role for the federal government in 
regulating medical practice that is both broader and narrower than the role 
that the federal government currently plays.  While other scholars have 
embraced the idea that the federal government should regulate particular 
aspects of medical practice,24 or explicitly argued that the federal government 
has the constitutional authority to regulate medical practice,25 this Article 
considers the goals of federalism in the context of medicine and proposes 
 
 22.  See, e.g., Brief of the American Dental Ass’n, American Medical Ass’n, et al., 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 
S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13–534) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of the American Dental Ass’n 
et al.]. 
 23.  See generally JAMES C. MOHR, LICENSED TO PRACTICE: THE SUPREME COURT 
DEFINES THE AMERICAN MEDICAL PROFESSION (2013). 
 24.  See, e.g., Yaniv Heled, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive 
Tissue–The Need for Federal Regulation, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 243 
(2010); Jaime S. King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation 
Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 283, 331 (2008); William M. 
Sage & David A. Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and 
Institutional Capacity, 84 TUL. L. REV. 781, 823–24 (2010); Michael S. Young & Rachel 
K. Alexander, Recognizing the Nature of American Medical Practice: An Argument for 
Adopting Federal Medical Licensure, 13 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 145, 166–67 (2010). 
 25.  See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the 
Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 161 (2004). 
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a general framework for determining when federal regulation of medical 
practice is warranted. Implementing the proposed framework could open 
new options for federal legal interventions to address serious public health 
problems. 
Part II of this Article traces the history of the conventional wisdom that 
the states govern medical practice, and describes how the states have 
carried out medical practice regulation.  Part III argues that, contrary to 
the conventional wisdom, the federal government is deeply entangled in 
regulating medical practice.  This regulation is both direct, as with the 
Controlled Substances Act’s rules about prescribing drugs of abuse,26 and 
indirect, as with Medicare coverage decisions27 and even certain patents.28  
Additionally, Part III demonstrates that there is nothing unlawful about 
such examples of federal oversight of medical practice—the Constitution 
permits the federal government to regulate most, if not all, medical 
practice.  Part III also offers an explanation for why these instances of 
federal regulation have been accepted despite the maxim that states are 
the primary regulators of medical practice, and suggests that the current 
approach to federal oversight is opaque and inconsistent, which drives law 
and policy in directions that are problematic at times.  Given that the federal 
government currently exerts, or fails to exert, its authority over medicine 
in ways that are problematic in some circumstances, the question then, is 
in what circumstances should the federal government intervene? 
Part IV answers that question by considering the goals of federalism.  
Because federal control of medicine has its own potential drawbacks and 
states may be better positioned to regulate some aspects of medical 
practice, Part IV argues that the federal government should oversee only 
those aspects of medical practice that cause or contribute to national 
public health problems that the states cannot address.  Depending on the 
problem to be addressed, this federal oversight might include direct 
requirements that expressly restrict the behaviors of practitioners and may 
preempt state oversight, or indirect forms of regulation, such as conditions 
on federal funds given to medical practitioners or state governments.  Part 
IV also suggests that abandoning the conventional wisdom would open 
new avenues for addressing serious public health crises, such as the problem 
 
 26.  See infra notes 160–70 and accompanying text. 
 27.  See infra notes 214–31 and accompanying text. 
 28.  See infra notes 277–83 and accompanying text. 
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of drug-resistant bacteria, through federal legal action, and examines how the 
framework proposed in this Article could be implemented. 
Because medical practice has a profound impact on the health and 
economy of the United States, effectively regulating it presents important 
and challenging legal and policy questions.  This Article helps to address 
those questions by proposing an implementable framework that incorporates 
both the goal of protecting the public health and the goal of preserving the 
benefits of a federalist system of government.  While this framework 
presents potential line-drawing problems because it may be difficult to 
determine what is a national public health problem that states cannot address, 
it nevertheless improves on the conventional wisdom by counseling lawmakers 
and federal administrative agencies to exert federal authority over medical 
practice in a principled and transparent manner. 
II. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: FEDERALISM AND THE                        
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 
The states, rather than the federal government, have a long history of 
regulating the practice of medicine.  The earliest American laws 
controlling the practice of medicine were enacted by the colonies,29 and 
the modern era of medical practice regulation began in 1873, when Texas 
established county medical boards to license practitioners.30  The states 
continue to actively regulate medical practice.  To assess the balance 
between federal and state power over the practice of medicine, it is useful 
 
 29.  See ROBERT C. DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1–7 (1969). 
 30.  See id. at 7; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: 
Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 828 (1995); Henry E. 
Sigerist, The History of Medical Licensure, 104 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1057, 1060 (1934).  
Although physician licensure first appeared in the seventeenth century, those earlier 
licensure policies were “guild-like” and largely abandoned by 1850.  Jost, supra, at 828.  
Texas’s licensing law established the first modern medical boards by requiring counties to 
appoint boards “to be composed of not less than three practicing physicians of known 
ability, and graduates of some medical college, recognized by the American Medical 
Association.”  Under the law, no person was permitted to practice medicine in Texas 
unless that person had received “the degree of ‘doctor of medicine’” from a “regularly 
established and well accredited medical college,” or “a certificate of qualification from 
some authorized board of medical examiners.”  GEORGE W. PASCHAL, A DIGEST OF THE 
LAWS OF TEXAS: CONTAINING THE LAWS IN FORCE AND THE REPEALED LAWS ON WHICH 
RIGHTS REST FROM 1754 TO 1875 1478f–1478g (4th ed. 2012).  The legislative history does 
not provide much insight into why the Texas legislature enacted this law.  See S. JOURNAL, 
13th Leg., 805–807 (Tex. 1873).  It may simply have been a sign of the times.  In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century the medical profession was becoming more 
organized and standardized, and at least certain factions of the profession were lobbying 
for licensing.  See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
MEDICINE 79–145 (1982); MOHR, supra note 23, at 15. 
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to consider the history of state regulation and how states implement medical 
practice regulation. 
A.  Defining the Practice of Medicine 
As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to understand what the term 
“practice of medicine” encompasses.  Definitions have changed over time, 
and varied across stakeholders and jurisdictions.  For example, a 1908 
article in the Journal of the American Medical Association defined the 
practice of medicine simply as the “art of healing,”31 and a 1904 article in 
the California State Journal of Medicine argued that an individual practices 
medicine when the “relations of the parties [a]re those of physician and 
patient.”32  But some state courts at the time did not consider an individual 
to be practicing medicine unless he administered drugs or performed 
surgery.33 
Modern legal definitions of the practice of medicine come from state 
statutes and courts, and what constitutes the practice of medicine often 
differs between states.34  As an example, an Arizona statute defines the 
practice of medicine as “the diagnosis, the treatment or the correction 
of . . . any and all human diseases, injuries, ailments, infirmities, deformities, 
physical or mental, real or imaginary, by any means, methods, devices or 
instrumentalities . . . . ”35  An Oregon statute similarly provides that 
diagnosing, curing, or treating any mental or physical disease is practicing 
medicine, but also specifically includes in its definition advertising that 
one is authorized to practice medicine, referring to oneself as a doctor, 
prescribing drugs, and performing surgery.36  Courts in different states 
 
 31.  Editorial, What Constitutes the Practice of Medicine?, 50 JAMA 368, 368 
(1908). 
 32.  William C. Tait, The Legal Definition of the Practice of Medicine, 2 CAL. ST. J. 
MED. 119, 119 (1904). 
 33.  See, e.g., Smith v. Lane, 31 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (24 Hun) 632, 634–35 (1881); see 
also Nelson v. State Bd. of Health, 157 S.W. 501, 505 (Ky. 1900) (holding that an 
osteopath is not required to be licensed because he does not “prescribe or administer 
medicine or perform surgery”); State v. Liffring, 55 N.E. 168, 168–69 (Ohio 1899) 
(concluding that a treatment is not medical practice unless it includes the administration 
of drugs); State v. Mylod, 40 A. 753, 755–56 (R.I. 1898) (noting that the practice of 
medicine “requires a knowledge of drugs”). 
 34.  See, e.g., Cynthia Marietta & Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic 
Testing: Is It the Practice of Medicine?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 369, 371 (2009). 
 35.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401 (2008). 
 36.  OR. REV. STAT. § 677.085 (2013). 
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have sometimes reached divergent conclusions about whether the same 
activities constitute medical practice, perhaps understandably given differences 
in the underlying statutory language.  For instance, a federal court in 
California concluded that reviewing a claim for an insurance company did 
not constitute the practice of medicine,37 while the Arizona Court of 
Appeals and the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that such activities 
were subject to the state medical boards’ jurisdiction.38  Also, although 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that a physician’s 
testimony as a non-treating expert witness fell within the practice of medicine,39 
the Missouri Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion.40  
Contemporary scholars have also diverged on whether particular activities 
constitute medical practice.  For example, whereas some scholars have 
argued that legal injection is not a medical procedure because of its non-
therapeutic goal,41 others have argued that death row inmates are akin to 
terminally ill patients and “deserve to be treated as such.”42 
Despite these differences, most state statutes and courts currently define 
the practice of medicine as involving at least two activities: (1) diagnosing 
a disease, condition, or injury; and (2) prescribing, administering, or 
providing a treatment for that disease, condition, or injury.43  To perform 
these activities most effectively and provide the highest quality medical 
care, practitioners generally assert that they need the flexibility to judge 
what is best for a particular patient.44  For example, practitioners’ freedom 
to prescribe an FDA-approved drug “off-label”—that is, for a condition 
or patient population, or at a dose, not approved by the FDA45—can 
 
 37.  See Jakway v. Unum Provident Corp., No. CV01-6753AHM(RZX), 2002 WL 
31996043, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2002). 
 38.  See State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Fallon, 41 S.W.3d 474, 
478–49 (Mo. 2001); Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 949 P.2d 530, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1997). 
 39.  See Joseph v. D.C. Bd. of Med., 587 A.2d 1085, 1091 (D.C. 1991). 
 40.  See Missouri Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Levine, 808 S.W.2d 
440, 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
 41.  See, e.g., Robert D. Truog et al., Physicians, Medical Ethics, and Execution by 
Lethal Injection, 311 JAMA 2375, 2375 (2014). 
 42.  Kenneth Baum, “To Comfort Always”: Physician Participation in Executions, 
5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 61 (2001). 
 43.  See, e.g., Marietta & McGuire, supra note 34, at 371; Noah, supra note 25, at 
162. 
 44.  See, e.g., ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 384–92 (2d ed. 1988). 
 45.  See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for 
Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 476 
(2009).  When the FDA approves a drug or device, it approves that product as safe and 
effective for a particular use—namely, to treat a particular disease or condition, in a 
particular patient population.  The uses for which the FDA has approved a product are 
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benefit a patient by allowing practitioners to incorporate into their practice 
emerging evidence that may not be sufficient for FDA approval or may 
not have been presented to the FDA for approval, which provides the 
patient with additional treatment options.46  Arguments in the United States 
against government—rather than practitioner—control of medical practice 
have long included assertions that government limits on practitioner 
discretion will decrease the quality of medical care.47  Consistent with the 
idea that good medical practice is individualized, ethical guidelines 
counsel practitioners to promote an individual patient’s best interests and 
respect each patient’s autonomy.48  This focus on the health and best 
interests of the individual distinguishes medicine from public health, 
which is concerned with the well-being of an entire population.49  As 
Jeffrey M. Drazen, a physician and editor-in-chief of the New England 
Journal of Medicine, wrote, the practice of medicine is carried out “on an 
individual basis, with the best interests of the patient foremost in the 
practitioner’s mind.”50 
 
listed on its FDA-approved label, and thus, using a product for an indication that is not 
FDA-approved, is known as an “off-label” use.  See id. 
 46.  See, e.g., Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the 
Role of the FDA, 358 N. ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008). 
 47.  Cf. JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 22 (2003) 
(noting that the American Medical Association lobbied against government health 
insurance in 1949 by arguing that it would “inevitably erode the quality of medical care 
by giving the government [rather than physicians] control over medical services”). 
 48.  See, e.g., BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR 
CLINICIANS 12–14 (5th ed. 2013); cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (finding that physicians have a duty to obtain informed consent from patients 
because “every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body”); Samia A. Hurst & Marion Danis, A Framework for 
Rationing by Clinical Judgment, 17 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 247, 248–51 (2007) 
(discussing physicians’ obligations to both ration healthcare resources and advocate for 
patients’ best interests). 
 49.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 4 (2d ed. 2008); see also COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 3 (1988) (noting, “public health 
does things that benefit everybody”); Onyebuchi A. Arah, On The Relationship between 
Individual and Population Health, 12 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 235, 235 (2009) 
(contending that “population health calls up images of non-individual health”). 
 50.  Jeffrey M. Drazen, Government in Medicine, 356 N. ENG. J. MED. 2195, 2195 
(2007). 
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B.  The Absence of Federal Regulation 
Given this focus on practitioner discretion and individualized care, it is 
perhaps to be expected that courts, medical practitioners, and Congress 
have not viewed the federal government—and the one-size-fits-all approach 
that may come with it—as a natural fit for regulating medical practice. 
1.  Courts 
Courts have often concluded that the federal government does not 
regulate medical practice.  Throughout the early twentieth century, courts 
likely would have struck down federal efforts to directly regulate medical 
practice on constitutional grounds.  During the Lochner era, the Supreme 
Court viewed the federal government’s commerce powers as quite 
limited,51 and the doctrine of dual federalism—“the concept that the state 
and national governments enjoy exclusive and non-overlapping spheres 
of authority”—held sway.52  Moreover, at that time medical practice was 
decidedly more local in nature than modern medical practice.  Many solo 
practitioners provided care in homes, rather than in offices or hospitals, 
and prescribed remedies that they made themselves, rather than commercial 
drugs.53 
In fact, in a 1925 decision, Linder v. United States, the Supreme Court 
stated that “[o]bviously, direct control of medical practice in the states is 
beyond the power of the federal government.”54  Since Linder, several 
lower courts have cited this language to support its stated proposition.55  
 
 51.  See Noah, supra note 25, at 161; see also Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of 
Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. 
REV. 605, 606–09 (1996) (describing the Lochner era). 
 52.  Robert A. Schapiro, Toward A Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 243, 246 (2005); see also United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) 
(“It cannot be denied that the power of a state to protect the lives, health, and property of 
its citizens . . . [is] essentially exclusive.”).  The idea that the federal government lacked 
the constitutional power to regulate medical practice persisted well past the early twentieth 
century, with at least one medical scholar claiming in 1969 that “the federal government 
cannot assume this function [of regulating medical practice] without an amendment to the 
Constitution.”  DERBYSHIRE, supra 29, at 18. 
 53.  See, e.g., PHILLIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH 19–24 (2003) 
(describing the transition from doctor-made medications to commercial medicines); 
STARR, supra note 30, at 60–79 (1982) (describing the end of the solo practitioner era); 
Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 476 (2011) (“The 
practice of medicine is increasingly nationalized . . . .”). 
 54.  Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925). 
 55.  See United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2004); Oregon v. 
Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 
U.S. 243 (2006); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 801 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1975); Metrolina Family Practice 
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For example, in United States v. Evers, Judge Robert E. Varner of the 
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama quoted this language to 
support his decision that a physician promoting and administering an 
FDA-approved drug for an unapproved use was practicing medicine, not 
misbranding drugs under federal law.56  Similarly, in Oregon v. Ashcroft, 
the Ninth Circuit quoted this language in holding unlawful a federal 
directive declaring physician-assisted suicide, which was permitted under 
Oregon law, to be in violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act.57  
Yet, in most of the cases in which courts citing Linder considered the 
validity of a federal statute or action that arguably restricted medical 
practice, the courts upheld those federal statutes and actions.58  In the cases 
in which a federal action was not upheld—such as Evers and Oregon v. 
Ashcroft—those holdings relied primarily on the scope of the statute at 
issue, rather than the scope of the federal government’s constitutional 
authority.59 
 
Grp., P.A. v. Sullivan, 767 F. Supp. 1314, 1320–21 (W.D.N.C. 1989) aff’d, 929 F.2d 693 
(4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Evers, 453 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (M.D. Ala. 1978) aff’d, 
643 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1981); FTC v. Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 697, 705 (N.D. 
Cal. 1975) aff’d, 532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976); Henderson v. Wright, No. 954718D, 1996 
WL 33401225, at *2 (Mass. Super. Nov. 27, 1996); cf. United States v. Rosen, 582 F.2d 
1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Linder in determining whether prescribing controlled 
substances was properly considered the practice of medicine); United States v. Larson, 
507 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Linder for the proposition that what constitutes 
medical practice must be determined based upon attending circumstances and a consideration 
of the evidence); O’Reilly v. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 426 P.2d 167, 171 (Cal. 1967) (citing 
Linder to uphold a federal exchange program for foreign physicians, “even though the 
power to regulate the practice of medicine is ordinarily committed to the states”); N.J. 
Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 384 A.2d 795, 808 (N.J. 1978) (citing Linder to 
support the proposition that “[p]rofessional licensing and regulation of professional 
misconduct are activities which have long been committed to the states . . . .”).  The only 
Supreme Court opinion that relied on Linder to support the proposition that the federal 
government cannot regulate medical practice is the dissent in Lambert v. Yellowley, cited 
infra note 64, at 214. 
 56.  See 453 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (M.D. Ala. 1978) aff’d, 643 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
 57.  See 368 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom., Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 58.  See, e.g., Singh, 390 F.3d at 190; Metrolina Family Practice Grp., P.A., 767 F. 
Supp. at 1320–21; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 801 F.2d at 1169–70; Rosenberg, 515 
F.2d at 198. 
 59.  See Evers, 453 F. Supp. at 1150; Gonzales, 368 F.3d. at 1124–25; see also 
Epstein, supra note 10, at 5 (arguing that FDA cannot regulate certain stem cell procedures 
because of the limits of its enabling statutes). But see Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 
at 705 (relying on Linder to hold that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is not 
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Despite Linder’s strong language, its holding is limited and its analysis 
does not fully support the proposition that the federal government cannot 
regulate medical practice.60  In Linder, the Supreme Court overturned Dr. 
Charles O. Linder’s federal conviction, under the Harrison Anti-Narcotic 
Act, for prescribing narcotics to relieve a patient’s addiction symptoms.61  
In reversing Dr. Linder’s conviction, the Court focused on the limits of 
what the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, a tax law, authorized, rather than on 
constitutional limits on federal authority.  The Court’s primary concerns 
were that applying the statute to the particular set of facts in Linder was 
“plainly inappropriate and unnecessary to reasonable enforcement of [the] 
revenue measure,”62 and that Congress did not intend to regulate medical 
practice through the statute.63  Although the Court reversed Dr. Linder’s 
conviction, it did not strike down the law itself.64 
Additionally, only a year after Linder was decided, the Court concluded 
that regulating medical practice was not outside the scope of the federal 
government’s constitutional authority in Lambert v. Yellowley.65  In 
Lambert, a physician sought to enjoin enforcement of a provision in the 
National Prohibition Act of 1919 that limited the amount of liquor that 
physicians could prescribe, on the grounds that “in certain cases . . . the 
use of spirituous liquor . . . in an amount exceeding [the limit] [wa]s 
necessary for the proper treatment of patients,” and the “control [of] medical 
practice in the states is beyond the power of the federal government.”66  
The Court rejected these arguments, concluding that “there is no right to 
practice medicine which is not subordinate to . . . the power of Congress 
 
authorized to require physicians to advertise that a drug is not FDA-approved, without 
discussing the FTC’s statutory authority). 
 60.  See Noah, supra note 25, at 161; but see PAUL D. CLEMENT & LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, LABORATORY TESTING SERVICES, AS THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, CANNOT BE 
REGULATED AS MEDICAL DEVICES 11 (2015) [hereinafter “CLEMENT & TRIBE”], available 
at http://www.acla.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Tribe-Clement-White-Paper-1-6-15.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/S5MP-R59J]. 
 61.  Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 22 (1925). The Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act 
imposed a tax on practitioners who distributed narcotics.  Id. at 5, 11.  Lower courts had 
interpreted the law as prohibiting physicians from prescribing narcotics solely to relieve 
patients’ addiction symptoms.  See id. at 10–12; Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914, ch. 
1, 38 Stat. 785 
 62.  Linder, 268 U.S. at 18. 
 63.  See id. at 22–23. 
 64.  Id. at 18; see also Noah, supra note 25, at 161 (noting that “[i]n 1925, the Court 
upheld the federal government’s first controlled substances legislation”). 
 65.  272 U.S. 581, 596–97 (1926); see also Noah, supra note 25, at 161 (describing 
the Court’s opinion in Lambert). But see Lambert, 272 U.S. at 598 (Sutherland, J., 
dissenting) (“Congress . . . cannot directly restrict the professional judgment of the 
physician or interfere with its free exercise in the treatment of disease.  Whatever power 
exists in that respect belongs to the states exclusively.”). 
 66.  Lambert, 272 U.S. at 588, 596. 
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to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
Eighteenth Amendment.”67  The Twenty-first Amendment repealed the 
Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibited the production, 
sale, and transport of alcohol.  But the Court’s logic in Lambert would 
apply equally to Congress’s authority to enact laws necessary and proper 
for carrying out its other powers. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Linder was decided at a time 
when courts still endorsed the Lochner-era view of regulation and the 
doctrine of dual federalism, both of which have long since been repudiated 
by courts.68  Accordingly, even if Linder at one time stood for the proposition 
that medical practice is beyond the reach of the federal government’s 
constitutional powers, it should no longer be viewed as supporting that 
proposition.  As Lars Noah has argued, “nothing [in the Constitution] 
requires that the practice of medicine remain sacrosanct as a potential 
subject of federal regulatory involvement.”69 
2.  Medical Practitioners and Congress 
In the absence of a constitutional bar on federal regulation of medical 
practice, political forces have discouraged federal oversight.  Since the 
turn of the twentieth century, medical practitioners have enjoyed “an 
especially persuasive claim to [cultural] authority.”70  Although the power 
and solidarity of medical practitioners may be waning, organized medicine 
continues to possess substantial political influence.71  For example, one 
lobbying study estimated that Congressional legislative assistants meet 
with physicians 29,000 times per year, and found that legislative assistants 
ranked 90% of the physicians with whom they met as either “effective” 
or “somewhat effective” at communicating their message.72  Additionally, 
 
 67.  Id. at 596 (internal citations omitted). 
 68.  See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) (rejecting dual 
federalism); Daniel A. Farber, Who Killed Lochner?, 90 GEO. L.J. 985, 1002–03 (2002) 
(reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000)) 
(describing the Court’s repudiation of Lochner). 
 69.  Noah, supra note 25, at 192. 
 70.  STARR, supra note 30, at 4. 
 71.  See Michael J. Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills—A System Popping 
Under Too Much Physician Discretion? A Law-Policy Prescription To Make Drug 
Approval More Meaningful in the Delivery of Health Care, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1085, 
1092, 1097–98 (2012). 
 72.  See Steven H. Landers & Ashwini R. Sehgal, How Do Physicians Lobby Their 
Members of Congress?, 160 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 3248, 3248 (2000). 
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OpenSecrets.org identifies the American Medical Association (AMA)—
the largest U.S. association of medical professionals—as one of the 140 
biggest overall donors to federal elections since the 1990 election cycle.73  
Organized medicine has used this clout to lobby against federal legislation 
that would govern medical practice,74 and to influence legal proceedings 
that implicate medical practice regulation.75 
Historically, medical practitioners’ efforts to prevent federal legislation 
affecting medical practice were quite successful.76  The AMA’s opposition to 
federal-government-mandated or -funded health insurance, which began as 
early as 1920, may offer the longest-running example of organized 
medicine’s successes.77 This opposition was partly based on concerns about 
federal oversight of medical practice78 and, with the exception of Medicare, 
was generally effective during the twentieth century.79  For example, the 
AMA’s opposition helped persuade President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
administration that health insurance should not be included as part of the 
Social Security Act of 1935. A 1939 proposal to provide federal grants to 
develop state health insurance plans failed to progress out of subcommittee 
after the AMA produced twenty-two arguments against it, and several other 
health care reform bills proposed during President Harry S. Truman’s 
administration suffered similar fates.80  Consistent with this history, the 
AMA opposed President Bill Clinton’s health care reform proposal in the 
1990s, spending three million dollars in its efforts defeat the Clinton 
 
 73.  See Center for Responsive Politics, American Medical Assn, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000068 [http://perma.cc/8SWJ-
53GH] (last visited Jan. 13, 2015). 
 74.  See, e.g., STARR, supra note 30, at 260.  Medical practitioners also have opposed 
specific instances of state legislation, such as a Florida law restricting physicians’ ability 
to talk about gun ownership with patients and a California bill that would require 
physicians to limit narcotic prescriptions to no more than a thirty-day supply.  See 
Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2012); William Heisel, 
Everybody Hurts: Bill Tackling Prescription Drug Abuse Felled by Cost Concerns, 
REPORTING ON HEALTH (June 6, 2014), http://www.reportingonhealth.org/2014/06/05/ 
everybody-hurts-bill-tackling-prescription-drug-abuse-felled-cost-concerns [http://perma.cc/ 
62LX-GDJM]. 
 75.  See, e.g., Litig. Ctr., About Us, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www. 
ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/litigation-center/about-us.page [http:// 
perma.cc/UMW7-J9TU] (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
 76.  See STARR, supra note 30, at 260–61. 
 77.  See id. at 247–48; OBERLANDER, supra note 47, at 19, 21–22. 
 78.  See, e.g., OBERLANDER, supra note 47, at 22; SHANNA ROSE, FINANCING MEDICAID: 
FEDERALISM AND THE GROWTH OF AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET 28–29 (2013). 
 79.  See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 78, at 27.  For a discussion of the role that the AMA’s 
opposition to Medicare played in the enactment of Medicaid, see id. at 38–46. 
 80.  See, e.g., STARR, supra note 30, at 269. 
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proposal.81  Like the other twentieth century predecessors to President Barack 
Obama’s successful health care reform effort, the Clinton Administration’s 
health care reform proposal failed.82 
In some instances, organized medicine has been able to persuade 
Congress to include in the legislation affecting medical practice, provisions 
that disavow any intent to regulate medical practice.83  The Social Security 
Amendments of 1954, for example, provided that “[n]othing in this 
subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the Commissioner of Social 
Security or any other officer or employee of the United States to interfere 
in any way with the practice of medicine.”84  The Medicare statute,85 the 
Fertility Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992,86 the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997,87 the Drug Addiction Treatment 
Act of 2000,88 and the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 
of 200789 each included a provision with similar language.  Even when a 
 
 81.  See, e.g., Sam Stein, American Medical Association Trying To Torpedo Health 
Care Reform Again, HUFFINGTON POST (July 11, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2009/06/11/american-medical-associat_n_214132.html [http://perma.cc/APC6-
QKT3]. 
 82.  See, e.g., Robert J. Blendon et al., What Happened to Americans’ Support for 
the Clinton Health Plan, 14 HEALTH AFF. 7, 8 (1995). 
 83.  See Noah, supra note 25, at 165–66. 
 84.  Social Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-761, § 106, 68 Stat. 1052, 
1080 (1954) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416). 
 85.  Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 290, 
291 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395) (“Nothing in [the Medicare statute] shall be 
construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or 
control over the practice of medicine.”). 
 86.  Pub. L. No. 102-493, § 3(i)(1), 106 Stat. 3146, 3149 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
263a-2(i)(1)) (“In developing the [federal embryo laboratory] certification program, the 
[Department of Health and Human Services] may not establish any regulation, standard, 
or requirement which has the effect of exercising supervision or control over the practice 
of medicine in assisted reproductive technology programs.”). 
 87.  Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 214, 111 Stat. 2296, 2348 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 396) 
(“Nothing in [the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] shall be construed to limit or 
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any 
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health 
care practitioner-patient relationship.”). 
 88.  Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3502, 114 Stat. 1222, 1226 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 
823(g)(2)(H)(i)) (“Nothing in such regulations or practice guidelines may authorize any 
Federal official or employee to exercise supervision or control over the practice of 
medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided.”). 
 89.  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 
§ 1111(d), 121 Stat. 823, 976 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-5a(d)) (“Nothing in this section 
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statute that affects medical practice does not include such provisions, 
concerns about federal regulation of medical practice may still drive 
decisions about the law—as demonstrated by the history of the Drug 
Quality and Security Act.90 
In addition to resisting legislation that would affect medical practice, 
the AMA and other medical organizations involve themselves in legal 
proceedings that implicate medical practice.91  For example, ten medical 
associations, including the AMA and the American Dental Association, 
filed a joint amicus brief with the Supreme Court in a case about the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ordering the North Carolina Board of 
Dental Examiners to stop sending cease-and-desist letters to teeth-whitening 
providers who were not licensed dentists.92  The FTC ordered the Board 
to stop sending the cease-and-desist letters on the ground that the Board 
was engaging in unfair competition in violation of federal antitrust law.93 
In their amicus brief, the medical organizations argued that federal antitrust 
law did not apply to the Board, and that affirming the FTC’s position 
“would have perverse consequences for patients and the public,” and that 
“Federal overturning of state policy choices . . . is particularly inappropriate 
where, as here, regulation of the health professions is at issue.”94  
Generally, federal antitrust law confers immunity to state actors, as medical 
organizations have argued.95  However, because a majority of the Board’s 
members were market participants—licensed dentists and a hygienist—
elected by other market participants and because the Board’s actions were 
not actively supervised by the state, the Court concluded that the Board’s 
cease-and-desist letters were not covered by state-action immunity.96  
While the medical organizations’ amicus brief was ultimately unsuccessful 
in achieving their aims in this case, it is one example of medical organizations’ 
opposing federal regulation of medical practice in the litigation setting. 
 
[of the Public Health Service Act] shall be construed to restrict, in any manner, the 
prescribing of antibiotics by physicians, or to limit the practice of medicine[.]”). 
 90.  See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. 
 91.  See, e.g., Litig. Ctr., supra note 75; Legal Advocacy and Litigation, AM. 
DENTAL ASS’N, http://www.ada.org/en/advocacy/legal-advocacy-and-litigation [http://perma. 
cc/W5VG-6BSF] (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
 92.  See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015); Amicus 
Brief of the American Dental Ass’n et al., supra note 22. 
 93.  See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1108–09. 
 94.  Amicus Brief of the American Dental Ass’n et al., supra note 22, at 2, 13. 
 95.  See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1110 (citing Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)). 
 96.  See id. at 1112–14.  Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented 
from this opinion and would have found that federal antitrust law did not apply to the 
Board’s actions.  Id. at 1118 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Although there are instances in which organized medicine has supported 
federal regulation of medical practice, that support was often conditioned 
on certain protections for practitioners’ interests.  In 1997, the AMA 
supported a federal bill that would have prohibited “intact dilation and 
evacuation” of a fetus—often referred to as a “partial-birth abortion”—
but only after lawmakers agreed to make clear that physicians could not 
be prosecuted for resorting to the procedure to save a mother’s life after 
beginning to deliver a baby.97  Moreover, the AMA later came to consider 
this conditional support for the 1997 bill a mistake and it did not support 
the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act that was eventually passed in 
2003 and upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart.98 
Additionally, in a departure from its resistance to healthcare reform in 
the twentieth century, the AMA and other organizations supported the 
passage of the Obama administration’s health care reform proposal—the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA).99  Although 
the PPACA is, perhaps, best known for its provision that subjects 
individuals who do not purchase health insurance to a financial penalty—
the “individual mandate”—one of its goals is to influence medical practice 
by incentivizing practitioners and hospitals to improve the quality of 
medical care.100  The AMA did support the PPACA, however, it opposed 
earlier versions of the law that would have created a government-sponsored 
insurance plan.101  The AMA’s support for the PPACA may have been 
 
 97.  See Will an AMA Endorsement Sway Any Votes? A Vote on Late-Term Abortion 
Ban Is Set for This Afternoon, CNN (May 20, 1997), http://www.cnn.com/ ALLPOLITICS/ 
1997/05/20/abortion.ama/ [http://perma.cc/6PSH-ZTNH]; Letter from P. John Seward, 
Exec. Vice President, Am. Med. Ass’n, to Rick Santorum, U.S. Senator (May 19, 1997), 
available at http://www.gargaro.com/ama.html [http://perma.cc/SWN5-2ZE6]. 
 98.  See Amy Sullivan, A Time to Choose: How Democrats Started Losing the 
Abortion Debate, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Dec. 2003), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ 
features/2003/0312.sullivan.html [http://perma.cc/X83Q-PJUC]; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124, 132–33 (2007). 
 99.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010); Lawrence D. Brown, The Elements of Surprise: How Health Reform 
Happened, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 419, 424–25 (2011). 
 100.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501(b); Robert Kocher et al., 
The Affordable Care Act and the Future of Clinical Medicine: The Opportunities and 
Challenges, 153 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 536, 536–37 (2010). 
 101.  See Robert Pear, Doctors’ Group Opposes Public Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, June 
10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/politics/11health.html?_r=2&hp& 
[http://perma.cc/37HJ-58QM].  It is worth noting that the AMA is not the only medical 
organization, and at least one group, Physicians for a National Health Program, supports 
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motivated by the belief that reform was imminent regardless of practitioners’ 
support, and accordingly, it was best to influence the reform rather than 
oppose it outright.102  In sum, the overall trend in organized medicine has 
been to oppose federal regulation of medical practice, unless the federal 
programs protected practitioners’ interests or their freedom to care for 
patients as they see fit. 
C.  The Presence of State Regulation 
The states possess broad authority to regulate the practice of medicine 
pursuant to their police powers.103  Against the backdrop of skepticism 
about federal regulation of medical practice, states have exercised this 
authority to oversee medical practice in a variety of ways. 
1.  The States’ Authority 
The states have long regulated the practice of medicine pursuant to their 
general police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of state 
citizens.104  States began to use their police powers to establish modern 
licensing requirements for medical practitioners in the late nineteenth 
century.105  And since at least 1889, when the Supreme Court decided 
Dent v. West Virginia, the Court has recognized states’ authority in this 
area.106 
 
a single-payer health insurance system.  Id.  The AMA is, however, the largest medical 
professional association and wields more power than other groups.  See id. 
 102.  See Brown, supra note 99, at 424–25. 
 103.  See, e.g., Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910); Edward P. Richards, 
The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide 
for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care 
Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 218 (1999). 
 104.  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 
(1872) (describing the police power as extending “to the protection of the lives, limbs, 
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons . . . within the State”); Noah, supra note 25, at 
159 (“The Supreme Court long ago recognized that the police powers of the states justified 
their regulation of the practice of medicine.”). 
 105.  Before then, virtually anyone, regardless of qualifications or credentials, was 
free to call himself “doctor” and treat, or, perhaps more accurately, attempt to treat, patients.  
Although the state—and federal—governments’ failure to play any gatekeeping role for 
medical practitioners may seem irresponsible, the lack of regulation may have made sense 
at the time.  Scientific knowledge was limited, and there were several different schools of 
medical practice, none of which were particularly effective.  Accordingly, there were few 
principled bases on which to decide who should, and should not, practice medicine.  See, 
e.g., MOHR, supra note 23, at 9–21. 
 106.  See 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889); Jost, supra note 30, at 827. 
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Dent involved a West Virginia licensing statute that was enacted in 
1881.107  The law was passed following determined lobbying efforts in its 
support by the Medical Society of West Virginia, which was founded with 
the goal of transforming medical practice from an unregulated profession 
that included “dangerous pretenders and quacks” into a “learned, science-
based, and legally-licensed profession.”108  The law required every medical 
practitioner in the state to obtain a certificate from a state board affirming 
that “he is a graduate of a reputable medical college . . . he has practiced 
medicine in the state continuously for the period of 10 years prior to the 
8th day of March, 1881”, or he has been found, upon examination by the 
board, to be qualified to practice medicine.109  Practicing medicine without 
such a certificate was a misdemeanor offense.110 
At the time the law was passed, the plaintiff, Frank Dent, had practiced 
medicine in West Virginia for seven years as an independent practitioner, 
and for five more years as an apprentice to his father.111  The state board 
refused to count his five-year apprenticeship when calculating his years 
of practice, and accordingly, refused to issue him a certificate because he 
had not practiced medicine for the requisite ten years.112  Dent subsequently 
received a medical degree, but the board determined that the school granting 
it was not a reputable one, and again refused to grant him a certificate.113  
Despite the board’s refusals, Dent continued to practice and was convicted 
of practicing medicine without a certificate.114 
After his conviction, Dent challenged the licensing statute on the ground 
that it violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because, 
having established a medical practice in West Virginia, he had a property 
 
 107.  See MOHR, supra note 23, at 63–79. 
 108.  See id. at 27–28, 63–79. 
 109.  Dent, 129 U.S. at 114. 
 110.  See id.  Those convicted of practicing without a certificate would be subject to 
“fines between $50 and $500, or imprisonment between thirty days and one year, or some 
combination of both.”  MOHR, supra note 23, at 69.  These penalties could be applied to 
“each and every” offense, meaning that a practitioner could be subject to up to $500 in 
fines and one year in prison for each visit with each patient that he saw.  Id. 
 111.  See MOHR, supra note 23, at 99. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See id. at 100–03. 
 114.  See Dent, 129 U.S. at 117–18.  It is worth noting that Frank Dent came from a 
family that had practiced medicine in West Virginia for four generations, and more 
importantly, had clashed with the politically powerful founder of the Medical Society of 
West Virginia.  For a comprehensive discussion of the facts and politics that led to Dent’s 
conviction and subsequent litigation, see MOHR, supra note 23. 
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right in his practice.115  The Court rejected Dent’s argument and upheld 
West Virginia’s licensing requirement as within “[t]he power of the state 
to provide for the general welfare of its people.”116  The Court explained 
that, while 
[i]t is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any 
lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose, . . . there is no arbitrary 
deprivation of such right where its exercise is not permitted because of a failure 
to comply with conditions imposed by the state for the protection of society.117 
Since Dent, courts have upheld a broad range of state medical practice 
laws against constitutional challenges, making clear that states are generally 
authorized to legislate in the medical practice area,118 and that courts are 
reluctant to recognize a First or Fourteenth Amendment right to be free 
from such regulation.  For example in 1921, the Supreme Court upheld a 
Minnesota law that prohibited medical practitioners from dispensing 
narcotics directly to addicts despite arguments that the law violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment and was preempted by federal law.119  In 1997, 
the Court rejected Fourteenth Amendment challenges to New York and 
Washington’s laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.120  In 2012, the 
Eighth Circuit was not persuaded by abortion providers’ arguments that a 
South Dakota law requiring that physicians inform patients seeking an 
abortion of an “increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide,” violated 
practitioners’ First Amendment rights and unduly burdened access to 
abortion.121  And in 2014, the Eleventh Circuit vacated an injunction 
against a Florida law restricting practitioners’ ability to communicate with 
patients about gun ownership because “it is uncontroversial that a state 
 
 115.  See Dent, 129 U.S. at 121; see also Jost, supra note 30, at 827 (explaining Dent’s 
argument). 
 116.  See Dent, 129 U.S. at 121. 
 117.  Id. at 121–22. 
 118.  See, e.g., Noah, supra note 25, at 159. 
 119.  See Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921). 
 120.  Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796–97 (1997) (holding that New York’s law 
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
705–06 (1997) (holding that Washington’s law does not violate the Due Process Clause). 
 121.  Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 897 (8th Cir. 2012).  A number 
of other state medical practice laws that have been challenged–and upheld–also concern 
abortion practices.  See, e.g., Erin Bernstein, The Upside of Abortion Disclosure Laws, 24 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 180–86 (2013); infra note 125 and accompanying text; cf. 
Guttmacher Inst., An Overview of Abortion Laws, ST. POLICIES IN BRIEF, May 1, 2015, 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
4RKN-V6QQ] (describing the range of state abortion laws that are in effect). 
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may police the boundaries of good medical practice” and “[a]ny burden 
the Act places on physician speech is [ ] entirely incidental.”122 
This is not to say that states’ authority to regulate medical practice is 
limitless. As an example, recently courts have struck down a few state 
laws restricting the off-label use of abortion-inducing drugs on the basis 
that the laws violate patients’ constitutional rights.  In 2013, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court determined that an Oklahoma law prohibiting off-label 
use of abortion-inducing drugs unduly burdened abortion access,123 and in 
2014 the Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to enjoin a similar Arizona 
law.124  But courts also have rejected arguments that comparable Ohio and 
Texas laws unduly burden abortion access in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.125  Moreover, that there are relatively few cases striking 
down state medical practice laws illustrates that the limits on states’ authority 
are few and far between.126 
2.  Carrying Out State Regulation 
States exercise their far-reaching authority to regulate medical practice 
in a number of ways.  Most importantly, states regulate medical practice 
by defining what falls within the scope of medical practice and requiring 
 
 122.  Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2014).  But 
see Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (enjoining 
the law on the grounds that it violated practitioners’ First and Fourteenth Amendments 
rights). 
 123.  See Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 2012 OK 102, ¶ 3, 292 P.3d 27, 
27–28.  Oklahoma’s law, unlike other similar state laws, required on-label use of all abortion- 
inducing drugs without exception.  This effectively prohibited non-surgical abortions 
because the label for mifepristone, the only drug that is FDA-approved for terminating an 
intrauterine pregnancy, states that two days after patients take mifepristone, they “must 
take” another drug, misoprostol.  Mifeprex (Mifepristone) Label, available at http://www. 
accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2004/020687s010-lbl.pdf [http://perma.cc/8BNZ-
8J9Y].  However, while misoprostol can cause abortions, it is not FDA-approved for that 
purpose.  See Cytotec (Misoprostol) Label, available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/019268s047lbl.pdf [http://perma.cc/S78U-D96M].  Thus, it is 
impossible to use all abortion-inducing drugs on label, and requiring the on-label use of 
all abortion-inducing drugs without exception de facto prohibits the use of any abortion-
inducing drugs. 
 124.  See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 918 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 125.  See Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 496 (6th 
Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Tex. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 605 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 126.  Cf. Noah, supra note 25, at 159 (“[N]o one today seriously doubts the proposition 
that the states enjoy the authority to adopt reasonable restrictions designed to promote the 
public health.”). 
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that those practicing medicine be licensed.127  Although which specific 
activities constitute medical practice vary by state, each state generally 
defines medical practice quite broadly.  Medical practice generally includes 
activities such as diagnosing and treating disease and conditions, as well 
as, in some cases holding oneself out as a medical practitioner, testifying 
as an expert witness, or reviewing claims for insurance companies.128  By 1895, 
all of the existing states had required that anyone practicing medicine be 
licensed, and had established state boards to oversee those requirements.129  
This continues today—all fifty states have boards that are responsible for 
licensing medical practitioners.130  The basic requirements for obtaining a 
medical license are consistent across states, and for physicians, include 
graduating from an accredited medical school, completing at least one year of 
a residency or fellowship, and passing a licensing examination.131  Beyond 
these basic requirements there is variation, with some states also requiring, 
among other things, interviews, a documented lack of a criminal history, 
and proof of malpractice insurance coverage.132  In addition to granting 
licenses, state boards are authorized to discipline licensees.133  Depending 
on the state, gross incompetence, physical or mental impairment, substance 
abuse, and aiding in the unauthorized practice of medicine, among other 
 
 127.  See, e.g., ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY, 
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 19 (2007) [hereinafter FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION] 
(noting that the “cornerstone” of medical practice regulation is states’ licensing schemes). 
 128.  See supra notes 34–43 and accompanying text. 
 129.  See DERBYSHIRE, supra note 29, at 8. 
 130.  See, e.g., Directory of State Medical and Osteopathic Boards, FED’N OF ST. 
MED. BOARDS, http://www.fsmb.org/state-medical-boards/contacts [http://perma.cc/GUW3-
C596] (last visited Feb. 18, 2015); Boards of Pharmacy, NAT’L ASS’N OF BOARDS OF 
PHARMACY, https://www.nabp.net/boards-of-pharmacy [https://perma.cc/ D7JG-ZDDA]; State 
Boards, AM. ASS’N OF DENTAL BOARDS, http://www.dentalboards.org/states/index.htm 
[http://perma.cc/BCV9-QJFX].  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in North Carolina 
State Board of Dental Examiners vs. FTC, discussed in section II.B.2, may lead to some 
changes in the composition of these boards or in how they operate.  But the decision does 
not mean that states generally cannot use such boards to oversee medical practice.  See 
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
 131.  See, e.g., Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of 
Medical Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 290 (2010); Janet M. Torpy et 
al., Medical Licensure, 304 JAMA 1286, 1286 (2010); Robert Kocher et al., Doctors 
Without State Borders: Practicing Across State Lines, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/18/doctors-without-state-borders-practicing-across-
state-lines/ [http://perma.cc/4NYV-ESQQ]. 
 132.  See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 131, at 291–92; Kocher et al., supra note 131. 
 133.  See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional 
Discipline: A Look at Medical Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 309, 326–30 (1993).  
In some cases, state boards also might take actions to prevent unlicensed individuals from 
practicing medicine.  See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1108. 
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things, are grounds for discipline.134  Disciplinary actions range from minor 
reprimands to limiting, suspending, or revoking a license.135 
Although defining the scope of medical practice, licensing requirements, 
and medical board disciplinary actions are the primary ways that states 
regulate medical practice, there are a number of other ways in which states 
exert their authority to oversee medicine.  As an example, states have 
enacted laws and regulations that directly circumscribe how licensed 
practitioners conduct medical practice.  As discussed in section II.C.1. 
above, some states have enacted laws that regulate controversial areas of 
medical practice, such as physician-assisted suicide and abortion.136  State 
laws and regulations, however, are not limited to these contentious areas.  
For instance, every state requires that medical practitioners report certain 
infectious diseases to the state.137  In addition, most states have enacted 
laws or regulations that encourage a pharmacy to substitute a generic drug 
when a physician prescribes a brand-name drug—essentially overriding a 
physician’s recommendation for a brand-name drug.138  As a corollary to 
the drug substitution laws, twenty-nine states have laws requiring that 
pharmacists provide certain information to patients when dispensing a 
generic drug that has been substituted for a brand-name drug.139  Some 
 
 134.  See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 131, at 291–92. 
 135.  See Jost et al., supra note 133, at 326–31; see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4731.22 (LexisNexis 2006) (“The state medical board . . . may limit, revoke, or suspend 
an individual’s certificate to practice, refuse to grant a certificate to an individual, refuse 
to register an individual, refuse to reinstate a certificate, or reprimand or place on probation 
the holder of a certificate . . . .”). 
 136.  See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
 137.  See Reportable Diseases, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ 
ency/article/001929.htm [http://perma.cc/K7C2-SXB6] (last updated May 19, 2013); see, 
e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120130 (West 2012) (stating that the California 
public health department is required to establish a list of reportable diseases). 
 138.  See Orange Book Preface, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapproval 
process/ucm079068.htm [http://perma.cc/D2RX-QSKD] (last updated Mar. 14, 2014); 
see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-619(b) (West 2008) (“[U]nless the purchaser 
instructs otherwise, the pharmacist may substitute a generic drug product . . . .”); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549(a) (2011) (specifying the conditions under which a pharmacist 
may substitute a generic drug). 
 139.  See SARAH LICHTMAN SPECTOR & MARA YOUDELMAN, NAT’L HEALTH LAW 
PROGRAM, ANALYSIS OF STATE PHARMACY LAWS: IMPACT OF PHARMACY LAWS ON THE 
PROVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES 23–75 (2010), available at http://www.healthlaw.org/ 
about/staff/mara-youdelman/all-publications/analysis-of-state-pharmacy-laws-impact-of-
state-pharmacy-laws-on-the-provision-of-language-services#.VWvMTs9VhBc [http://perma.cc/ 
A3AS-DMWN]. 
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states require that certain information be provided to patients about various 
conditions or treatments.  California, for example, requires that physicians 
distribute standardized pamphlets to patients about blood transfusions, 
breast cancer, gynecological cancers, silicone implants, prostate cancer, and 
patients’ rights and remedies when they have been sexually involved with 
their therapist.140  States also require that certain procedures be performed 
within specific, but varying, timeframes.  New Hampshire, Michigan, and 
Massachusetts require that infants be treated with eye drops immediately, 
within one hour, or within two hours after birth, respectively.141  Similarly, 
every state requires that medical practitioners perform certain tests to 
screen newborns for genetic or metabolic disorders, although what tests 
must be performed differs among the states.142  State legislators in New 
York even proposed establishing a dress code for medical practitioners.143 
In addition to these state laws and statutes, medical malpractice 
liability—a creature of state law—provides a mechanism for private 
enforcement of medical practice standards.144  In general, medical practitioners 
are liable for harm caused by care that deviates from the professional 
standard.145  In addition to making the injured patient “whole” through 
compensation, one purpose of holding medical practitioners liable for such 
care is to reduce injuries by deterring substandard care.146  While there is 
 
 140.  MED. BD. OF CAL., GUIDE TO THE LAWS GOVERNING THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 
BY PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 70–71 (7th ed. 2013), available at http://www.mbc.ca.gov/ 
About_Us/Laws/laws_guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/K3WB-YHSK]. 
 141.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:6 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5125 
(West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 109A (West 2003).  Newborns are treated 
with drops to prevent eye infections, such as gonorrhea or chlamydia that can be contracted 
during delivery if the mother is infected.  Your Baby’s First Hours of Life, 
WOMENSHEALTH.GOV (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/childbirth- 
beyond/baby-first-hours.html [http://perma.cc/J5AT-FM23]. 
 142.  About Newborn Screening: Conditions Screened by State, BABY’S FIRST TEST, 
http://www.babysfirsttest.org/newborn-screening/states [http://perma.cc/9RNC-BG4H] 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015); see also Jennifer Kraszewski et al., Legal Issues in Newborn 
Screening: Implications for Public Health Practice and Policy, 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 92, 
92–93 (2006), available at http://www.publichealthreports.org/issueopen.cfm?articleID 
=1585 [http://perma.cc/QMF9-GY63] (discussing the legal issues raised by state newborn 
screening programs). 
 143.  S.B. 4909, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at http://open.nysenate. 
gov/legislation/bill/S4909-2011 [http://perma.cc/E68L-P2TW]. 
 144.  See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1, 2 (1997).  Although medical malpractice was traditionally a common law doctrine, a 
number of states have enacted statutes that govern aspects of medical malpractice claims, 
such as caps on damages.  See id. at 3–4. 
 145.  See, e.g., Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The 
Historical Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1193, 1212 (1992). 
 146.  See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability 
System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1570 (2010). 
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no reliable empirical evidence that malpractice liability actually accomplishes 
this goal,147 it nevertheless is another way in which states, rather than the 
federal government, regulate medical practice. 
Lastly, states historically have relied on professional organizations to 
police many areas of medical practice.148  While such self-regulation is 
not as pervasive as it once was,149 certain domains of self-regulation persist.  
For example, with limited exceptions,150 states generally do not restrict 
practitioners’ off-label prescribing; instead, professional organizations have 
issued policies describing when off-label use is appropriate.151  Additionally, 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners vs. FTC discussed in section II.B.2., some scholars 
argued that, because medical practitioners generally comprise a majority 
of the members of state medical boards, practitioners effectively govern 
their own licensure and discipline.152  It is not yet clear how, or whether, 
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners will change the composition 
of state boards, or how they operate.153  Nevertheless, delegating oversight 
to the medical profession itself is another way states oversee—or decline 
to oversee—medical practice. 
 
 147.  See id.; Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical 
Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606–15 
(2002).  This is not to say that medical malpractice liability serves no purpose.  In addition 
to compensating injured patients, scholars have argued that malpractice liability brings 
medical errors to light, and in certain specialties, has improved patient safety.  See, e.g., 
TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 93–117 (2005). 
 148.  See FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION, supra note 127, at 24–28; ROBERT I. 
FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED “FREE MARKET” HEALTH 
CARE 122–30 (2013) [hereinafter FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION]; STARR, supra note 30, at 
24–28; Malinowski, supra note 71, at 1091–99. 
 149.  See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, How American Doctors Lost Their Professional 
Autonomy, FORBES (May 16, 2014, 8:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottgottlieb/ 
2014/05/16/how-american-doctors-lost-their-professional-autonomy/ [http://perma.cc/B8ML- 
H7RR]. 
 150.  See supra notes 123–23 and accompanying text for a discussion of state laws 
restricting off-label use of abortion-inducing drugs. 
 151.  See, e.g., Dresser & Frader, supra note 45, at 479. 
 152.  See, e.g., M. Christine Cagle et al., Privatizing Professional Licensing Boards: 
Self-Governance or Self-Interest?, 30 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 734, 750–51 (1999). 
 153.  See, e.g., Lisa Schencker, Supreme Court Ruling Carries Implications for 
Regulatory Boards, Modern Healthcare (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare. 
com/article/20150225/NEWS/150229950/supreme-court-ruling-carries-implications-for-
regulatory-boardsl [http://perma.cc/PX5C-3TZJ]; see also N.C. State Bd. of Dental 
Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1123 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not clear what 
sorts of changes [to boards] are needed to satisfy the test that [the majority] now adopts.”). 
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III.  CHALLENGING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
As the previous section demonstrates, the states extensively regulate 
medical practice—but, as this section shows, the federal government also 
plays a substantial, although haphazard and at times opaque, role in 
controlling medical practice, both directly and indirectly.154 
A.  Examples of Federal Regulation 
This section synthesizes the evidence challenging the conventional 
wisdom to show that there are multiple circumstances in which the federal 
government oversees medical practice.  From wide-ranging oversight, 
such as regulating the use of controlled substances,155 influencing medical 
decision-making through Medicare payment policies,156 and the PPACA’s 
incentives for improving the quality of medical care,157 to narrower instances 
of oversight such as the federal ban on off-label use of Human Growth 
Hormone,158 the federal government exercises an enormous amount of 
control over certain areas of medicine.  Although by no means exhaustive,159 
the following examples of direct and indirect federal regulation of medical 
 
 154.  Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 
(1998) (describing, in general but not in the medicine context, both direct and indirect 
forms of regulation). 
 155.  See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text; infra notes 154–74 and 
accompanying text. 
 156.  See infra notes 214–31 and accompanying text. 
 157.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a), 
124 Stat. 119, 242–44 (2010); Robert Kocher et al., The Affordable Care Act and the 
Future of Clinical Medicine: The Opportunities and Challenges, 153 ANNALS OF 
INTERNAL MED. 536, 536–37 (2010). 
 158.  See infra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 159.  For instance, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) is 
a federal law that influences medical practice that is not discussed in depth in this section.  
In short, EMTALA requires hospitals that participate in Medicare and offer emergency 
services to provide treatment and stabilizing care to patients with emergency medical 
conditions, regardless of their ability to pay.  Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., 
Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act (EMTALA), CMS.GOV, http://www.cms. 
gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EMTALA/index.html?redirect=/EMTALA/ [http:// 
perma.cc/8A74-AN9B] (last modified Mar. 26, 2012).  The PPACA’s incentives for 
practitioners and hospitals to improve the quality of medical care, the application of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act to dentists’ decisions about which patients to treat, and 
the national coordination of physician discipline through the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986 are additional examples of federal influence over medical 
practice that are not discussed in depth in this section.  See Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act § 1501(b) (providing incentives for practitioners and hospitals to improve quality 
of care); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (holding that HIV infection is a 
disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in a case involving 
dental care); FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION, supra note 127, at 31–32 (describing the 
Health Care Quality Improvement Act). 
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practice illustrate the many ways that the federal government regulates 
medicine. 
1.  Direct Regulation 
The following are examples of direct federal regulation of medical 
practice—where the federal government explicitly restricts practitioners’ 
behavior, and practitioners can be penalized for failing to comply with 
such restrictions. 
a.  The Controlled Substances Act 
The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA) is one example of direct 
federal regulation of medical practice.160  The CSA authorizes the federal 
government to regulate controlled substances, which include FDA-
approved drugs that are associated with a risk of addiction or abuse.161  
Under the CSA, the federal government directly regulates medical practice in 
two ways: (1) it restricts how controlled substances are used in medical 
practice; and (2) it dictates which practitioners may use controlled substances. 
First, the use of a controlled substance is restricted based on which of 
five “schedules” the drug falls into.  Controlled substances are categorized 
into these five schedules depending on their potential for abuse, accepted 
medical uses, and safety, with substances in Schedule I subject to the most 
severe restrictions and substances in Schedule V subject to the least 
severe.162  Because drugs in Schedule I are deemed to have no accepted 
medical uses, practitioners may not prescribe, dispense, or distribute them.163  
 
 160.  See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-513, §§ 100–411, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242–84 (1970). 
 161.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 811(c), 812 (2012); see also Aaron Gilson & Ben A. 
Rich, Legal and Regulatory Issues in Pain Management, in ESSENTIALS OF PAIN MEDICINE 
(Honorio Benzon et al. eds., 3d ed. 2001).  Certain controlled substances, such as 
extended-release and long-acting opioids, are also subject to FDA-required Risk 
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies that indirectly control how medical practitioners may 
use those drugs.  See discussion infra section III.A.2.b. 
 162.  See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMIN., OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL 5–6 (2006) [hereinafter 
DEA MANUAL], available at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/pract 
_manual012508.pdf [http://perma.cc/8295-BAPY]. 
 163.  See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012); DEA MANUAL, supra note 162, at 5.  For 
example, because marijuana is a Schedule I drug, practitioners violate federal law if they 
choose to treat their patients with marijuana, even if state law permits it.  Cf. Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (holding that the CSA applied to patients’ intrastate use of 
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Drugs in Schedules II through V may be used in medical practice, but their 
use is limited.  For example, for Schedule II drugs, such as hydrocodone,164 
practitioners must provide written prescriptions for the drugs—they may 
not provide oral prescriptions over the phone—and no refills are permitted.165  
Also, drugs in Schedules II through V may not be prescribed for 
“detoxification treatment” or “maintenance treatment” unless the FDA 
has approved them for that use.166 
Second, under the CSA, the federal government controls who may use 
controlled substances in their medical practice.167  In order to prescribe, 
distribute, or dispense controlled substances in Schedules II through V, 
practitioners must register with the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), the agency primarily responsible for enforcing the CSA.168  The 
DEA may refuse to register a practitioner if it determines that registering 
the practitioner “would be inconsistent with the public interest.”169  
Furthermore, if practitioners are convicted of an offense under the CSA 
punishable by more than one year in prison, the federal government may 
order them to forfeit their state-issued medical license.170 
Because the CSA authorizes the federal government to govern the use 
of controlled substances and which medical practitioners may use them, 
it is unsurprising that the legislative history and cases concerning the 
CSA, discuss its impact on medical practice.  In hearings before a Senate 
Subcommittee prior to the CSA’s enactment, the American Psychiatric 
Association expressed concern that these “enforcement authorities seemed to 
 
medical marijuana permitted under California law).  That said, the federal government has 
chosen to limit its enforcement of federal prohibitions on marijuana in certain circumstances.  
See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
All U.S. Attorneys, on Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/F8U9-CVSD]. 
 164.  Hydrocodone is an opioid found in many drugs that are approved for pain relief; 
fixed-dose combinations of hydrocodone and acetaminophen—the active ingredient in 
Tylenol—are some of the most widely used drugs in the United States.  Although drugs 
containing hydrocodone as their sole active ingredient have long been in Schedule II, the 
DEA recently moved the fixed-dose combinations of hydrocodone and acetaminophen to 
Schedule II as well.  See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Rescheduling of Hydrocodone 
Combination Products from Schedule III to Schedule II, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,661, 49,662, 
49,675 (Aug. 22, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308), available at http://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-22/pdf/2014-19922.pdf [http://perma.cc/4D7G-NUSJ]. 
 165.  See 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (2012). 
 166.  21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(c) (2014). 
 167.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(10), 823 (2012); DEA MANUAL, supra note 162, at 4, 7. 
 168.  See DEA MANUAL, supra note 162, at 7. 
 169.  21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2012). 
 170.  See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012); United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 190 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
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be dictating the practice of medicine.”171  Additionally, although courts 
have generally rejected arguments that the CSA impermissibly regulates 
medical practice,172 the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the CSA 
regulates medical practice, at least in a limited way.  In Gonzales v. Oregon, 
the Court explained that “Congress regulates medical practice insofar as 
it bars doctors from using their prescription-writing powers as a means to 
engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking,” but also that the CSA 
“manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally . . . .”173  
However, because controlled substances include some of the most widely 
used drugs in the United States,174 the CSA’s impact on medicine is, in 
practice, quite extensive. 
b.  Use of Human Growth Hormone 
Another example of direct federal regulation involves drugs containing 
Human Growth Hormone (HGH).  For most prescription drugs, once they 
receive FDA approval, a practitioner may prescribe, dispense, or administer 
them for any use, including off-label uses.175  This, however, is not the 
case for HGH.  Section 303(e) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA) prohibits knowingly prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
HGH for anything other than its FDA-approved uses.176  Human Growth 
Hormone is approved for a variety of indications, including the treatment 
of children with short stature and adults with growth hormone deficiency,177 
 
 171.  Federal Drug Abuse and Drug Dependence Prevention, Treatment, and 
Rehabilitation Act of 1970: Hearing on S. 3562 Before the Special Subcomm. on 
Alcoholism & Narcotics of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 91st Cong. 248 (1970) 
[hereinafter 1970 CSA Senate Hearing]. 
 172.  See, e.g., Singh, 390 F.3d at 190. 
 173.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269–70 (2006). 
 174.  See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Rescheduling of Hydrocodone 
Combination Products From Schedule III to Schedule II, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,661, 49,675 
(Aug. 22, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-22/pdf/2014-19922.pdf [http://perma.cc/4D7G-NUSJ]. 
 175.  See, e.g., Dresser & Frader, supra note 45, at 476.  With the exception of HGH 
and the limits on prescribing controlled substances for detoxification and maintenance 
treatment, the federal government currently does not prohibit off-label prescribing and, 
with the exception of abortion-inducing drugs, states also have not restricted practitioners’ 
discretion to prescribe off-label. 
 176.  21 U.S.C. § 333(e) (2012); Dresser & Frader, supra note 45, at 477 n.11. 
 177.  See, e.g., Humatrope, Label, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/ 
label/2011/019640s084lbl.pdf [http://perma.cc/XKN2-Y23Y]; see also Thomas T. Perls 
et al., Provision or Distribution of Growth Hormone for Antiaging: Clinical and Legal 
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but not the anti-aging and athletic performance-enhancing uses with 
which it is often associated.178 
Interestingly, unlike the other examples of federal regulation described 
in this section, the addition of section 303(e) to the FDCA did not spark 
concerns about federal regulation of medical practice.  Moreover, 
notwithstanding that this provision was added to the FDCA in 1990,179 
in 1997 Congress opined: 
[I]t has been the long held view of Congress that the FDA should not regulate the 
practice of medicine.  In general, the FDA has no authority to regulate how 
physicians prescribe approved drugs in the context of their medical practice. 
Physicians prescribing off-label uses of approved drugs is not within the 
jurisdiction of the FDA.180 
This failure to acknowledge section 303(e)’s effect on medical practice 
may arise from Congress’s interest in the use of HGH to enhance athletic 
performance, rather than in its therapeutic uses.  Congress added section 
303(e) to the FDCA through the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990.181  
The law was enacted after congressional hearings about widespread use 
of performance-enhancing drugs in sports,182 as well as several high 
profile athletic scandals, including a 1988 Sports Illustrated story reporting 
extensive steroid use in the University of South Carolina’s football program 
that led to the indictment of four coaches.183  Consistent with this context, 
 
Issues, 294 JAMA 2086, 2087 (2005) (summarizing the approved uses of various HGH-
containing drugs); S. Jay Olshansky & Thomas T. Perls, New Developments in the Illegal 
Provision of Growth Hormone for “Anti-Aging” and Bodybuilding, 299 JAMA 2792, 
2792 (2008) (describing approved adult indications for HGH-containing drugs). 
 178.  See, e.g., Olshansky & Perls, supra note 175, at 2792. 
 179.  See United States Attorneys’ Manual, Human Growth Hormone/Steroids 
Statutory Overview, OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, http://www.justice.gov/usam/civil-
resource-manual-19-human-growth-hormonesteroids-statutory-overview [http://perma. 
cc/CV8Y-ZY6T] [hereinafter Manual, HGH/Steroids] (last visited May, 15, 2015). 
 180.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-310, at 60 (1997). 
 181.  See Manual, HGH/Steroids, supra note 179.  The Anabolic Steroids Control 
Act was enacted as Title XIX of the Crime Control Act of 1990.  See Crime Control Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1904, 104 Stat 4851, 4853 (1990). 
 182.  See Anabolic Steroid Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 4658 Before the Subcomm. 
on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 8 (1990) (statement of Rep. 
William J. Hughes, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime); Abuse of Steroids in Amateur and 
Professional Athletics: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2, 10 (1990) (statements of Rep. William J. Hughes, Chairman, H. 
Subcomm. on Crime & Paul J. Tagliabue, NFL Comm’r); see also Steroids in Amateur 
and Professional Athletics: The Medical and Social Costs of Steroids Abuse: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 179 (1989) (statement of Bill Fralic, 
NFL Player) (hearing in which witnesses testified to rampant steroid use in the NFL). 
 183.  See Tommy Chalkin & Rick Telander, The Nightmare of Steroids, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 24, 1988), http://www.si.com/vault/1988/10/24/118707/the-nightmare-of- 
steroids-south-carolina-lineman-tommy-chaikin-used-bodybuilding-drugs-for-three-years- 
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many of the criminal investigations and prosecutions brought under 
section 303(e) have involved practitioners providing HGH to athletes.184 
c.  The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act185 is a third example of direct 
federal regulation.  This federal law, enacted in 2003, prohibits physicians 
from knowingly performing a procedure that the law calls “partial-birth 
abortion.”186  The statute defines a partial-birth abortion as “an abortion 
in which the person performing the abortion . . . deliberately and intentionally 
vaginally delivers a living fetus” until a certain portion of the fetus is 
outside the mother’s body, and “performs the overt act, other than completion 
of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus.”187  As interpreted 
by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, the case upholding the law, 
this language prohibits physicians from intentionally performing one 
particular abortion procedure: “intact dilation and evacuation.”188 
Congress clearly intended to directly regulate medical practice by 
prohibiting this procedure.  In upholding the law, the Supreme Court 
noted, “the legislative power [was] exercised in this instance . . . to 
regulate the medical profession.”189  Consistent with the Court’s view, the 
medical profession perceived this law as interfering with medical practice.  
For example, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG), which is “the leading professional association of physicians who 
specialize in the health care of women,” argued said that the law “will 
 
they-drove-him-to-violence-and-nearly-to-suicide [http://perma.cc/GC8Z-S6FZ]; 4 Ex-
Football Aides Indicted in South Carolina Steroid Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1989, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/20/sports/4-ex-football-aides-indicted-in-south-carolina- 
steroid-case.html [http://perma.cc/QNE3-YWKZ]. 
 184.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Powermedica Defendants 
Sentenced for Conspiracy to Illegally Distribute Human Growth Hormones and Steroids 
(Apr. 20, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm252 
150.htm [http://perma.cc/L8WD-2JYT]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Colorado 
Springs Pharmacists Convicted of Charges Related to Importation and Distribution of 
Anabolic Steroids and Chinese-Made Human Growth Hormones (Jan. 2, 2010), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm200282.htm [http://perma.cc/92 
MF-687S]. 
 185.  See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 
(2003). 
 186.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2012). 
 187.  Id. § 1531(b)(1). 
 188.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 154–56 (2007). 
 189.  Id. at 166. 
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chill doctors from providing a wide range of procedures used to perform 
induced abortions or to treat cases of miscarriage.”190 
2.  Indirect Regulation 
The following examples illustrate indirect regulation of medical 
practice—that is, they are examples of federal requirements that do not 
apply to practitioners and practitioners do not incur penalties when the 
requirements are violated but, nevertheless, they affect medical practice. 
a.  FDA’s Pre-Market Authorization of Drugs, Devices, and Biologics 
Although courts, Congress, and the FDA have attempted to draw a firm 
line between what constitutes regulating medical practice versus medical 
products,191 the FDA’s review of medical products—drugs, devices, and 
biologics—before they enter the market offers one of the most sweeping 
examples of how the federal government indirectly regulates medical 
practice.  In general, drugs, biologics, and medical devices cannot be used 
for medical treatment in the United States until the FDA determines that 
they are safe and effective.192  Although medical product manufacturers 
and sellers, rather than practitioners, typically incur penalties for marketing 
unapproved medical products,193 medical practitioners’ options for treating 
their patients are limited by the FDA’s judgment about what products are 
 
 190.  Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos. 05-380, 
1382), 2006 WL 2867888, at *1, *22; Am. Cong. Of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 
ACOG Statement on the US Supreme Court Decision Upholding the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, ACOG (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.acog.org/About_ ACOG/ 
News_Room/News_Releases/2007/ACOG_Statement_on_the_US_Supreme_Court_Dec
ision [http://perma.cc/6YYN-F79U]. 
 191.  See, e.g., supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text; see also CLEMENT & TRIBE, 
supra note 60, at 11 (arguing that the FDA lacks authority over certain diagnostics because 
they constitute medical practice, rather than medical products). 
 192.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d), 360c(i), 360e (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(B) (2012).  
There are some medical products that may be sold without FDA approval. For example, 
drugs that are “generally recognized . . . as safe and effective” and have been used “to a 
material extent” and “for a material time” may be marketed without FDA approval.  See 
21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p), 355(a) (2012). 
 193.  The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits a number of activities, 
such as introducing an unapproved drug or device into interstate commerce, that entities 
which make and sell medical products, rather than practitioners, are likely to violate.  See 
21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012); but see United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 
1326 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming an injunction against practitioners who provided autologous 
stem cell treatments in violation of the FDCA). 
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safe and effective.194  That is, the FDA indirectly regulates medical practice 
by determining which medical products may be sold, and thus, used, by 
medical practitioners, in the United States. 
Indeed, throughout the FDA’s history, concerns have been raised that 
the FDA’s role as gatekeeper of medical products is tantamount to the 
regulation of medical practice.  For example, when Congress amended the 
FDCA in 1962 to require that a drug’s effectiveness be demonstrated 
before marketing, the AMA opposed the amendments on the ground that 
the FDA’s effectiveness determinations about drugs would interfere with 
physicians’ ability to provide treatments in their patients’ best interests.195  
In a Senate hearing on the 1962 amendments, an AMA spokesperson 
asserted, “only the individual physician [can] determine the efficacy of a 
given drug in the treatment of a given patient.”196  Likewise, one Newsweek 
columnist argued “[i]t is a dangerous legal precedent to allow any bureaucrat 
to keep off the market something that, even though harmless, is in his 
opinion ‘ineffective.’ This is trying to protect the patient against the judgment 
of his doctor.”197  When amendments to the FDA’s regulatory scheme for 
devices were enacted in 1997, Congress included language protecting 
practitioners’ discretion to prescribe and administer legally marketed devices 
off-label, presumably to address concerns about the FDA interfering with 
medical practice.198  Moreover, the notion that authorizing the FDA to 
evaluate the effectiveness of medical products is “dangerous” for patients 
persists today, particularly in the context of terminally ill patients’ access 
 
 194.  Because the FDA’s statutory authority is linked to the movement of a product 
or its components through interstate commerce, theoretically, there may be some medical 
products produced and used wholly intrastate that would not be subject to the FDA’s 
oversight.  It is difficult, however, to conceive of a modern medical product, except 
perhaps medical marijuana, that does not travel in interstate commerce such that the FDA 
would not have jurisdiction over it.  Cf. Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at 1326 (affirming 
the FDA’s jurisdiction over autologous stem cell treatments); but see Epstein, supra note 
10, at 1–2 (arguing that the FDA’s statutory authority does not extend to the autologous 
stem cell treatments at issue in Regenerative Sciences). 
 195.  See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(c), 76 Stat. 780, 781 
(1962); HILTS, supra note 53, at 139–40. 
 196.  Richard Harris, The Annals of Legislation: The Real Voice-II, THE NEW YORKER, 
Mar. 21, 1964, at 146 [hereinafter Harris, The Real Voice-II]. 
 197.  HILTS, supra note 53, at 140. 
 198.  See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-115, § 214, 111 Stat. 2296, 2348 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 396); Noah, supra 
note 25, at 166. 
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to unapproved therapies.199  While the language of its enabling statute may 
prevent the FDA from restricting off-label use of medical devices, it 
nevertheless indirectly regulates medical practice by determining which 
therapeutic products may be used in medical practice. 
b.  FDA-Required Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies 
The FDA’s drug safety authority provides another example of how the 
agency indirectly regulates medical practice.  The Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA)200 significantly 
strengthened the FDA’s drug safety authority by, among other things, 
authorizing it to require Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies 
(REMS) for certain drugs.201  The FDA can require a REMS for a prescription 
drug when the agency determines that a REMS is necessary to ensure that 
a drug’s benefits outweigh its risks.202  Put simply, REMS impose requirements 
on a drug manufacturer that go beyond providing warnings and other 
information on a drug’s label.203  Through a REMS, the FDA can require, 
among other things, that drug manufacturers undertake various “elements to 
 
 199.  See, e.g., Christina Corieri, Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering 
the Terminally Ill to Take Control of Their Treatment, GOLDWATER INST. (Feb. 11, 2014),  
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/healthcare/right-to-try/everyone-deserves-
right-try-empowering-terminally-/ [http://perma.cc/7G4A-873W]; see also Patricia J. 
Zettler & Henry T. Greely, The Strange Allure of State Right-to-Try Laws, 174 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 1885 (2014) (discussing the Right-to-Try movement at the state level); 
Seema K. Shah & Patricia J. Zettler, From A Constitutional Right to A Policy of 
Exceptions: Abigail Alliance and the Future of Access to Experimental Therapy, 10 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 135 (2010) (analyzing terminally ill patients’ access to 
unapproved drugs in general). 
 200.  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 
§§ 901–921, 121 Stat. 823, 922-62 (Sept. 27, 2007). 
 201.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a) (2012); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FORMAT AND CONTENT OF PROPOSED RISK EVALUATION AND 
MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS), REMS ASSESSMENTS, AND PROPOSED REMS 
MODIFICATIONS (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter DRAFT REMS GUIDANCE], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM184128.pdf [http://perma.cc/93 
GU-R58Y] (describing the REMS provisions in FDAAA); Bruce M. Psaty & David Korn, 
Congress Responds to the IOM Drug Safety Report—In Full, 298 JAMA 2185 (2007) 
(“FDAAA represents the most extensive revisions of the [FDCA] since 1962.”). 
 202.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a), (b).  More specifically, the FDA can require REMS 
for prescription drugs, including controlled substances, that are submitted for approval or 
are already approved under a new drug application (NDA), an abbreviated—generic—
new drug application (ANDA), or a biological license application (BLA). 
 203.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1; DRAFT REMS GUIDANCE, supra note 201, at 2–7.  
REMS requirements apply to the person(s) who submit for approval covered NDAs, 
ANDAs, or BLAs, or who hold approved applications of these types.  21 U.S.C. § 355-
1(a).  Because these persons are typically the drug’s manufacturer, for simplicity this 
Article describes the REMS requirements as applying to a drug’s manufacturer. 
ZETTLER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/27/2015  1:55 PM 
[VOL. 52:  427, 2015]  Federal Oversight of Medicine 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 463 
assure safe use,” such as ensuring that practitioners who prescribe or 
dispense the drug have special training, a drug is dispensed only in certain 
settings such as hospitals, or that certain test results are documented 
before a drug is dispensed.204 
Isotretinoin—commonly known by its brand name, Accutane—is an 
example of a drug subject to a REMS that imposes some of these 
restrictions.205  Isotretinoin is approved for the treatment of “severe 
recalcitrant nodular acne,” but causes serious birth defects when taken by 
pregnant women and girls.206  Accordingly, the REMS for isotretinoin 
requires the drug’s manufacturers to ensure that isotretinoin prescribers 
and dispensers are specially certified, and women and girls have two negative 
pregnancy tests documented nineteen days apart before a pharmacist 
dispenses the drug.207  To become certified, prescribers must agree to provide 
contraception counseling and pregnancy testing for women and girls, and 
pharmacies that dispense the drug must affirm that their pharmacists will 
dispense the drug only to REMS-qualified patients and dispense no more 
than a 30-day supply of the drug.208 
The drug manufacturer is the entity ultimately responsible for ensuring 
that REMS requirements are met—meaning that the drug manufacturer, 
and not medical practitioners, will be the subject of any FDA enforcement 
actions that result from REMS violations.209  REMS requirements, however, 
do affect medical practice because practitioners are responsible for carrying 
out many of the elements to assure safe use.  In some ways, REMS 
requirements’ impact on medical practice is fairly limited because, of the 
approximately 22,000 approved brand-name and generic prescription 
 
 204.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3)(A), (C), (D). 
 205.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY 
(REMS), THE IPLEDGE PROGRAM, SINGLE SHARED SYSTEM FOR ISOTRETINOIN (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationfor
PatientsandProviders/UCM234639.pdf [hereinafter IPLEDGE].  Accutane’s manufacturer 
withdrew Accutane from the market in 2009, but numerous generic versions of the drug 
continue to be marketed.  See Determination That ACCUTANE (Isotretinoin) Capsules, 
10 Milligrams, 20 Milligrams, and 40 Milligrams, Were Not Withdrawn from Sale for 
Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 75 Fed. Reg. 39024, 39025 (July 7, 2010), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-07-07/pdf/2010-16439.pdf [http://perma.cc/CG 
P2-J6NU]. 
 206.  See, e.g., Absorbica, Label, available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugs 
atfda_docs/label/2012/021951s000lbl.pdf [http://perma.cc/X5CR-Z568]. 
 207.  See IPLEDGE, supra note 205. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(f)(4)(A), 352(y), 355(p) (2012). 
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drugs,210 only about 121 are subject to REMS that include elements to 
assure safe use.211  But when a drug is subject to a REMS that includes 
elements to assure safe use, how practitioners use that drug is significantly 
affected by tasks that they must perform, such as pregnancy testing and 
patient counseling in the case of isotretinoin.  Discussions of the FDA’s 
REMS authority have acknowledged this reality.  The AMA, for example, 
has said that REMS “affect the daily practice of medicine,”212 and a 
pharmacist writing in Pharmacy Times argued that “REMS ha[ve] the 
potential to interfere with the practice of medicine.”213  Risk Evaluation 
and Mitigation Strategies thus provide an additional example of the FDA 
indirectly regulating medical practice. 
c.  Medicare Coverage Levels and Covered Benefits 
Notwithstanding the first provision in the Medicare statute, which states 
“[n]othing in this [law] shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer 
or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of 
medicine,”214 the coverage levels and covered benefits under Medicare 
offer a third example of indirect federal regulation of medical practice.215  
Medicare is a government-funded insurance program for individuals sixty-
five years of age and older who qualify for Social Security retirement 
benefits.216  In general, Medicare covers “items or services” that are 
 
 210.  See, e.g., Development and Distribution of Patient Medication Information for 
Prescription Drugs; Public Hearing, 75 Fed. Reg. 52765, 52766 (Aug. 27, 2010), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-08-27/pdf/2010-21326.pdf [http://perma.cc/LH 
7Z-LQNQ]. 
 211.  See Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), FDA (May 
19, 2014) [hereinafter List of Approved REMS], http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/ 
postmarketdrugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucm111350.htm [http://perma.cc/E2 
Z4-738T].  Although there are only about forty approved REMS with elements to assure 
safe use, each “single shared system” REMS applies to multiple drugs. 
 212.  AM. MED. ASS’N, REPORT 8 OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
REPORT, THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF DRUG SAFETY IN THE UNITED STATES: RISK 
EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS) 1 (2010). 
 213.  Darshan Kulkarni, Is REMS Interfering with the Practice of Medicine?, 
PHARMACY TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.pharmacytimes.com/blogs/for-the-record/ 
0312/Is-REMS-Interfering-With-the-Practice-of-Medicine [http://perma.cc/ANZ5-HRYV]. 
 214.  42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012). 
 215.  See, e.g., FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION, supra note 148, at 132 (describing how 
Medicare transformed medical practice); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 501 n.151 (2002) (“Medicare supervises or controls medical 
practice in countless ways.”). 
 216.  42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012); see also Patricia Barry, Do You Qualify for Medicare?, 
AARP BULLETIN (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info-04-
2011/medicare-eligibility.html [http://perma.cc/V8WY-93YV] (explaining who qualifies 
for Medicare).  Medicare also covers certain individuals who are under 65 years of age, 
such as those with end-stage renal disease.  See id. 
ZETTLER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/27/2015  1:55 PM 
[VOL. 52:  427, 2015]  Federal Oversight of Medicine 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 465 
“reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or 
injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member.”217  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—the federal 
agency that administers Medicare—determines what items and services 
qualify as “reasonable and necessary,” and how much to pay for them.218 
Medical decisions, in turn, are affected by which products and services 
are covered, and the amount that Medicare pays for them.  For example, 
one study found that a provision in the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)219 that changed 
how physician reimbursements for outpatient chemotherapy drugs were 
calculated, affected which chemotherapy drugs physicians prescribed for 
their patients with metastatic cancer.220  Physicians generally bill Medicare 
directly for drugs that the physician purchases and administers to the 
patient, like chemotherapy drugs.221  Before the MMA was enacted, 
physicians were reimbursed for such drugs at ninety-five percent of the 
Average Wholesale Price of the drug,222 which created a financial incentive 
to administer drugs for which the difference between the physician’s cost 
and ninety-five percent of Average Wholesale Price was greatest.223  After 
the MMA eliminated this incentive, oncologists selected different 
 
 217.  42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2012). 
 218.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395g, 1395w–4 (2012); MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY 
COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 245 (Mar. 2003), available 
at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/Mar03_Entire_report.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [http:// 
perma.cc/5M48-NPMK]. 
 219.  Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
 220.  Mireille Jacobson et al., Does Reimbursement Influence Chemotherapy Treatment 
for Cancer Patients?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 437, 437 (2006). 
 221.  See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.: MEDICARE 
REIMBURSEMENT OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1 (Jan. 2001), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/ 
oei/reports/oei-03-00-00310.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWZ6-JA4F].  Physicians also receive 
a separate fee for administering the drug, which is intended to compensate their time and 
effort, and the expenses of operating a medical practice.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, MEDICARE: PAYMENTS FOR COVERED 
OUTPATIENT DRUGS EXCEED PROVIDERS’ COST 14 (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter GAO, MEDICARE 
REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011118.pdf [http://perma.cc/89DX-
SQQT]. 
 222.  See Jacobson et al., supra note 220, at 437.  The Average Wholesale Price is a 
term that CMS has defined by regulation.  See 42 C.F.R. § 405.517 (2014). 
 223.  See GAO, MEDICARE REPORT, supra note 221, at 4.  Although physicians could 
have elected to bill Medicare at rates below ninety-five percent of the Average Wholesale 
Price, very few did.  See id. 
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chemotherapy drugs for their patients with metastatic cancer.224  In other 
words, the study found that the amount of reimbursement did not affect 
whether oncologists treated their patients with chemotherapy, but did 
affect which chemotherapy drugs oncologists prescribed their patients.225  
Similarly, a study of a 1991 change in Medicare’s reimbursement policy 
for recombinant human erythropoietin treatment for dialysis patients 
demonstrated that the change in policy affected patients’ treatment.226  
Specifically, after the policy change tied reimbursement more closely to 
the amount of erythropoietin that was administered to a patient, the mean 
dose per treatment increased.227  These studies demonstrate that, by deciding 
what products and services are covered and their reimbursement amounts, 
Congress and CMS can influence medical practice.  Beyond influencing 
medical practice through payment structures, Congress also has used 
Medicare to more directly regulate medical practice by, for example, 
restricting to whom a healthcare provider may refer Medicare patients.228 
Thus, it is unsurprising that, similar to the other examples in this section, 
there is concern that Medicare could affect medical practice.  This is most 
clearly demonstrated by language in the Medicare statute that explicitly 
prohibits federal interference with medical practice.229  Yet, as the studies 
described above make clear, this language has not had the desired effect 
of completely preventing Medicare’s interference with medical practice, 
and courts have generally rejected arguments that Medicare policies interfere 
with medical practice in violation of this provision.230  Additionally, because 
private insurers often follow Medicare’s lead, the effect of the federal 
government’s decisions likely reach beyond Medicare patients.231 
 
 224.  See Jacobson et al., supra note 220, at 442. 
 225.  See id. 
 226.  See Neil. R. Powe et al., Medicare Payment Policy and Recombinant 
Erythropoietin Prescribing for Dialysis Patients, 22 AM. J. KIDNEY DISEASE 557, 557 
(1993). 
 227.  See id. 
 228.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012). 
 229.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012). 
 230.  See, e.g., Coll. of Am. Pathologists v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 859, 867–68 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); Home Health Care, Inc. v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 587, 589–91 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Szekely 
v. Fla. Med. Ass’n, 517 F.2d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 1975); Rasulis v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 
1006, 1010 (7th Cir. 1974); Portland Adventist Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 1092, 
1098 (D.D.C. 1983); Am. Med. Ass’n v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1189–91, 1201–03 
(N.D. Ill. 1977); see also Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. 
Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (finding a law that established professional standards 
physicians must meet to be compensated under Medicare or Medicaid did not interfere 
with medical practice), aff’d mem., 423 U.S. 975 (1975). 
 231.  See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of a Giant: Medicare’s Influence on Private Payment Systems (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
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B.  Far-Reaching Federal Powers 
The above examples of direct and indirect federal regulation contradict 
the maxim that states are the sole, or primary, regulators of medical 
practice.  However, each of these examples was well within Congress’s 
constitutional powers.  In fact, the Constitution authorizes the federal 
government to further extend its reach into medical practice.232  Congress 
could exercise its commerce, spending, and taxing powers, among others, 
to govern most—if not all—medical practice. 
1.  Commerce Powers 
The Supreme Court has explained that the reach of the Commerce 
Clause is broad.233  It authorizes Congress to regulate “the channels of 
interstate commerce, persons or things in interstate commerce, and those 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”234  It is this third 
category—activities that substantially affect interstate commerce—that 
has enabled the federal government to regulate a wide range of seemingly 
local activities, including intrastate sale of milk,235 growing wheat for one’s 
own use,236 loan sharking,237 and growing marijuana for intrastate use.238 
Given this reach, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance in which 
medical practice does not substantially affect interstate commerce.239  
First, medical practice is clearly a commercial activity that is part of an 
 
Research, Working Paper No. w19503, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=233 
6368 [http://perma.cc/X72J-YTA2]. 
 232.  Cf. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Food & Drug Admin., 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (D. 
Del. 1980) aff’d, 634 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980) (“It is undisputed that the practice of 
medicine is subject to the exercise of state police power . . . .  But that assumption does 
not imply an absence of federal jurisdiction . . . where the federal regulation constitutes a 
reasonable exercise of a power vested in Congress under the Constitution.”). 
 233.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578–79 
(2012). 
 234.  Id. at 2578 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 235.  See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1942). 
 236.  See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942). 
 237.  See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). 
 238.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005). 
 239.  Cf. Noah, supra note 25, at 169 (arguing that modern medical practice is subject 
to the federal government’s commerce powers); King, supra note 24, at 331 (explaining 
that all eight circuit courts that have considered the issue have concluded that reproductive 
clinics engage in interstate commerce). 
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“economic enterprise.”240  In 2009, the most recent year for which the U.S. 
Census Bureau has published data, the United States spent $1.7609 trillion 
on medical services,241 which constituted approximately 12% of the U.S. 
gross domestic product (GDP) that year.242  Second, modern medical practice 
involves “concrete ties” to interstate commerce.243  Practitioners are often 
part of large insurance networks or hospital chains that operate in multiple 
states.244  Patients may travel across state lines for treatment, particularly 
for innovative or specialist care,245 and practitioners may advertise to 
attract out-of-state patients.246  Additionally, many health problems that 
are affected by medical practice—such as prescription drug abuse, which 
costs the United States an estimated $72 billion a year247—impact the 
national economy.  Based upon these facts, Congress would be justified in 
finding that many, if not all, aspects of medical practice substantially affect 
interstate commerce and therefore, in enacting a federal law regulating it.248 
Congress has done just that.  Relying on its commerce powers, Congress 
has enacted laws that directly and indirectly regulate medical practice.249  
Moreover, courts have recognized these laws as valid exercises of the 
government’s commerce powers.  For example, Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, which upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion 
 
 240.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
 241.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 
101 tbl.134 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0134.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/9J34-QY62]. 
 242.  This percentage was calculated based on the World Bank’s report that U.S. GDP 
was $14.4179 trillion in 2009. World Development Indicators, WORLD DATABANK, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx?isshared=true (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2015).  All health care spending amounted to approximately 18% of the U.S. 
GDP.  Health Expenditure, Total (% of GDP), WORLD DATABANK, http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS [http://perma.cc/H6RS-7TDY] (last visited Feb. 
11, 2015). 
 243.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
 244.  See Noah, supra note 25, at 169. 
 245.  Id. at 170. 
 246.  For example, the website for one of the largest U.S. fertility clinics, located in 
Maryland, specifically welcomes patients from other states.  World Class IVF and Egg Donor 
Treatment For International and U.S. Patients, SHADY GROVE FERTILITY, http://www.shady 
grovefertility.com/out_of_area [http://perma.cc/G49T-2XVA] (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
 247.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES 5 (2013) 
[hereinafter HHS REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE], available at http://www.cdc. 
gov/HomeandRecreationalSafety/pdf/HHS_Prescription_Drug_Abuse_Report_09.2013.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2CRZ-97C5]. 
 248.  Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (noting that “under the Commerce Clause [the Court] 
of course consider[s] legislative findings”). 
 249.  See section III.1, supra. 
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Ban Act, noted that Congress enacted the law under its commerce powers.250  
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit upheld Federal Trade Commission regulations 
governing the profession of optometry as within the federal government’s 
commerce powers.251 Congress could go further by, for instance, restricting 
off-label use of additional drugs. 
It is also worth noting that the limits on Congress’s commerce powers 
articulated in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius 
do not apply to the argument that medical practice substantially affects 
interstate commerce.  Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in National Federation 
of Independent Businesses explained that the individual mandate in the 
PPACA was not a permissible exercise of Congress’s commerce powers 
because it compelled otherwise inactive individuals to become active in 
commerce.252  But in the medical practice context, practitioners are already 
active in commerce—in other words, there is “existing commercial activity” 
to regulate.253  In sum, even if medical practice was once a local activity 
outside the scope of Congress’s commerce powers, modern medical 
practice substantially affects interstate commerce and thus, is within the 
federal government’s reach.254 
  
 
 250.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166 (2007).  The law, by its own terms, 
applies only to those physicians who are “in or affect [] interstate or foreign commerce.”  
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2003).  Justice Thomas, in his 
concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia, took care to note that “whether the Partial–
Birth Abortion Ban Act . . . constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under 
the Commerce Clause is not before the Court.”  Carhart, 550 U.S. at 169 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  This may suggest some skepticism, by at least Justices Thomas and Scalia, 
that the commerce powers reach abortion procedures. 
 251.  See Am. Optometric Ass’n v. FTC, 626 F.2d 896, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see 
also LensCrafters, Inc. v. Wadley, 248 F. Supp. 2d 705, 729 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (“[The 
D.C. Circuit] has upheld federal regulations requiring optometrists to provide their patients 
with copies of their prescriptions . . . thereby implicitly rejecting the argument that the 
profession of optometry is exempt from federal commercial regulation.”). 
 252.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012). 
 253.  Id. at 2587. 
 254.  Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (“As interstate 
commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come to 
have effects on the national economy, and have accordingly come within the scope of 
Congress’ commerce power.”). 
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2.  Spending Powers 
The spending clause “provides Congress broad discretion to . . . spend 
for the ‘general Welfare,’ including by funding particular . . . private 
programs or activities,” and “[t]hat power includes the authority to impose 
limits on the use of such funds to ensure they are used in the manner 
Congress intends.”255  For example, in rejecting a First Amendment challenge 
to regulations that prohibited practitioners who received federal family-
planning funds from discussing abortion with their patients, the Supreme 
Court opined: 
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a 
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, 
without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with 
the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government . . . has merely chosen 
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.256  
Because the federal government pays almost half of all health care 
expenses in the United States,257 Congress’s spending powers provide an 
avenue for regulating a significant amount of medical practice: selectively 
funding medical services and placing conditions on those who receive 
payments.  Indeed, the federal government already exercises its spending 
powers in this way.  Federally-funded health care systems, such as the 
Veterans Health Administration258 or the Indian Health Service,259 are clearly 
controlled by the federal government.  Additionally, as discussed above, 
Medicare reimburses only those items and services that CMS determines 
 
 255.  Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 
2327–28 (2013) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991); see also U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States . . . .”).  Although Congress’s spending and taxing powers 
come from the same clause of the Constitution, this Article addresses them separately for 
clarity. 
 256.  Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.  The majority opinion also rejected the argument that the 
regulations violated a woman’s Fifth Amendment right to terminate her pregnancy, 
reasoning that “Congress’ refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a 
pregnant woman with the same choices as if the Government had chosen not to fund 
family-planning services at all.”  Id. at 202. 
 257.  ORG. FOR ECON. DEV., OECD HEALTH STATISTICS 2014: HOW DOES THE UNITED 
STATES COMPARE? 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/Briefing-Note-
UNITED-STATES-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/DTX8-445V]. 
 258.  See Veterans Health Administration, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFF., 
http://www.va.gov/health/ [http://perma.cc/FJ2U-CV35] (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).  The 
Veteran’s Health Administration is the largest health system in the United States, 
“providing care to more than 8.3 million veterans per year.”  Id. 
 259.  See About HIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, INDIAN 
HEALTH SERVICE, http://www.ihs.gov/aboutihs/ [http://perma.cc/R9XU-QH83] (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2015). 
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are “reasonable and necessary,”260 and the federal government places 
limits on health care practitioners who receive Medicare and Medicaid funds.  
For instance, a physician cannot refer Medicare and Medicaid patients to 
other health care providers in which that physician has a financial interest.261 
Here, like the commerce context, the federal government could go 
further than it currently does.  As an example, recent research suggests that 
when pediatricians present vaccination as an option, rather than a foregone 
conclusion, parents are more likely to decline recommended vaccinations 
for their children.262  Research also indicates that many pediatricians 
agree to parents’ requests to spread out recommended vaccines for their 
children, despite concerns that spreading out vaccines puts the children 
at risk for disease and is more painful for the children.263 Accordingly, 
Congress might choose to fund programs to encourage childhood vaccination, 
and prohibit participating practitioners from spreading out vaccinations, or 
providing information about exemptions from state laws mandating 
vaccination.264 
To the extent the federal government offers funding to the states for 
health-related programs, it might also reach medical practice by 
“condition[ing] those offers on compliance with specified conditions.”265  
In the wake of National Federation of Independent Businesses, in which 
seven of the Court’s justices found that placing new conditions on the 
existing level of federal funding for states’ Medicaid programs was 
unconstitutionally coercive,266 scholars have suggested that the era in 
which conditions on states’ receipt of federal funds were essentially 
unchecked has ended.267  Yet, even with stronger limits on the federal 
government’s ability to place conditions on state funds, the federal 
government may be able reach certain aspects of medical practice.  For 
 
 260.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2012). 
 261.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012). 
 262.  See Douglas J. Opel et al., The Architecture of Provider-Parent Vaccine Discussions 
at Health Supervision Visits, 132 PEDIATRICS 1037, 1037 (2013). 
 263.  See Allison Kempe et al., Physician Response to Parental Requests to Spread 
Out the Recommended Vaccine Schedule, 135 PEDIATRICS 666, 666 (2015). 
 264.  For an overview of state laws regarding vaccinations, see Immunization Managers, 
Requirements and Laws, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc. 
gov/vaccines/imz-managers/laws/ [http://perma.cc/MFW8-ABCR] (last updated Feb. 3, 2015). 
 265.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012). 
 266.  See id. at 2587. 
 267.  See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, The Courts and Public Health: 
Caught in a Pincer Movement, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 394 (2014); Lynn A. Baker, 
The Spending Power After NFIB v. Sebelius, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 72–73 (2014). 
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example, to address prescription drug abuse, the federal government 
might condition the receipt of new federal funds for Medicaid on states 
establishing a database to track prescriptions for drugs of abuse, and 
requiring practitioners to report prescriptions to the database.268 
3.  Taxing Powers 
Congress’s taxing powers provide another avenue for influencing medical 
practice.  The federal government’s taxing powers, like its commerce and 
spending powers, are quite broad.  The taxing clause “gives the Federal 
Government considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly 
regulate.  The Federal Government may enact a tax on an activity that it 
cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control.”269  The federal government 
may impose taxes to “influence conduct,” as long as those taxes do not 
become so punitive as to be penalties.270  Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion 
in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius—upholding 
the PPACA’s individual mandate as a permissible exercise of Congress’s 
taxing powers—made clear that “the breadth of Congress’s power to tax 
is greater than its power to regulate commerce.”271 
Congress has used its taxing powers in the past to control medical 
practice.  As an example, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 imposed a yearly 
tax on medical practitioners who compounded, dispensed, prescribed, or 
administered marijuana,272 and was opposed by the AMA based on 
concerns that the “prohibitive tax” would prevent physicians and pharmacists 
from prescribing and dispensing the drug.273  Although the Controlled 
Substances Act of 1970 repealed this law,274 there are other ways in which 
the federal government might aim to influence various aspects of medical 
practice through its taxing authority.  The federal government might, for 
instance, impose a tax on physicians with high prescription rates for 
 
 268.  As of 2011, thirty-seven states had prescription drug monitoring programs 
along these lines.  See State Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
OFF. OF DIVERSION CONTROL, http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq/rx_monitor.htm#4 
[http://perma.cc/Q3ZY-9M43] (last updated Oct. 2011). 
 269.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579. 
 270.  Id. at 2599. 
 271.  Id. at 2600. 
 272.  Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 551, 551–52 (1937). 
 273.  Taxation of Marihuana: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 75th 
Cong. 91 (1937) (statement of Dr. William C. Woodward, Legislative Counsel, American 
Medical Association). 
 274.  The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-513, §§ 100-709, 84 Stat. 1236, 1281 (1970).  The Marihuana Tax Act was repealed 
after the Supreme Court held the law unconstitutional to the extent compliance with it 
amounted to self-incrimination under state narcotic laws.  See Leary v. United States, 395 
U.S. 6, 28 1969). 
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controlled substances, to address prescription drug abuse by discouraging 
the over-prescription of such drugs.275 
4.  Other Sources of Power 
In addition to exercising its commerce, spending, and taxing powers, 
there are various other ways, somewhat different than the previous 
examples, through which the federal government could, and does, directly 
and indirectly influence certain realms of medical practice. As an example 
of direct regulation, the federal government heavily regulates medical 
practice in the military, directly restricting military practitioners’ autonomy 
when necessary to further the goal of maintaining an effective fighting 
force.276  If a practitioner were to disobey orders to provide particular 
medical care, the practitioner could be punished, and that punishment likely 
would be upheld as a valid exercise of the federal government’s military 
powers.277 
While the previous example demonstrates direct regulation of medical 
practice, the federal government’s grants of certain patents, pursuant to 
the Patent and Copyright Clause,278 represents indirect regulation of medical 
practice.  Patents can affect medical practice even though federal law explicitly 
eliminates patent infringement remedies against medical practitioners 
 
 275.  In fact, physicians who register with the DEA to prescribe controlled substances 
already pay fees.  See Registration Categories and Fees, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF 
DIVERSION CONTROL, http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugreg/categories.htm [http://perma. 
cc/BWE4-J532].  Moreover, tracking physician-prescribing patterns would be feasible 
because it is something that some drug companies already do.  See Scott Glover & Lisa 
Girion, OxyContin Maker Closely Guards Its List of Suspect Doctors, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
11, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/11/local/la-me-rx-purdue-20130811 [http://perma. 
cc/658G-G2WM]. 
 276.  See Victor W. Sidel & Barry S. Levy, Physician-Soldier: A Moral Dilemma?, 
in MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS 293, 296 (Thomas E. Beam & Linette R. Sparacino eds., 
2003); Efthimios Parasidis, Justice and Beneficence in Military Medicine and Research, 
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 792 (2012); Robert N. Strassfeld, The Vietnam War on Trial: The 
Court-Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 839, 849 (1994). 
 277.  Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (authorizing the federal government “[t]o 
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part 
of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States”); Parker v. Levy, 417 
U.S. 733, 761 (1974) (upholding the court-martial of a military doctor who, among other 
things, refused to provide medical training to soldiers); Gordon D. Henderson, Courts-
Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293, 299–
300 (1957) (explaining that courts-martial predated the Constitution, but at least some 
framers believed the militia clause authorized the continuation of courts-martial). 
 278.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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who infringe certain medical procedure patents.279  For example, to the 
extent patents on medical products block the marketing of competitor 
products,280 patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
much like the FDA’s gatekeeping, can determine the universe of treatments 
that a medical practitioner may provide. As another example, patents on 
genetic material have been used to prevent practitioners from providing 
genetic testing services to their patients.281  Although a 2013 Supreme 
Court decision invalidated one genetic testing company’s patents on “isolated 
genes,” it upheld the company’s patents on another type of genetic 
material—known as cDNA—and, until recently, the company continued 
to pursue patent infringement claims against those offering genetic tests 
arguably covered by these its patents.282  Likewise, insofar as medical 
process patents cover patent-eligible subject matter, they have been used 
to restrict the treatment options that practitioners can provide.283  Thus, 
Congress’s commerce, spending, and taxing powers are not the only 
means by which it can govern medical practice. 
C.  What to Make of the Existing Federal Oversight 
Because the Constitution authorizes Congress to extensively regulate 
medical practice, there is nothing unlawful about the examples of federal 
oversight described in section III.A.  Nevertheless, given the historical 
resistance to various guises of federal oversight of medicine, such as 
 
 279.  See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c); Katherine J. Strandburg, Legal But Unacceptable: 
Pallin v. Singer and Physician Patenting Norms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE 
EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 321, 321 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus & Jane C. 
Ginsburg, eds. 2014). 
 280.  See, e.g., Larry Husten, Medtronic to Pay Over $1 Billion to Settle Patent 
Litigation with Edwards Lifesciences, FORBES.COM (May 20, 2014), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/larryhusten/2014/05/20/medtronic-to-pay-over-1billion-to-settle-patent-litigation- 
with-edwards-lifesciences/ [http://perma.cc/73MJ-WRGT] (describing a now settled patent 
dispute between two medical device companies, which would have limited the availability 
of certain medical devices in the United States). 
 281.  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2114 (2013). 
 282.  See id. at 2119, 2120; Jacob S. Sherkow & Christopher Scott, Myriad Stands 
Alone, 32 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 620, 620 (2014); Utah Court Dismisses Two More 
BRCA Testing Patent Lawsuits Against Labcorp, Ambry, GENOMEWEB (Jan. 27, 2015), 
available at https://www.genomeweb.com/business-news/utah-court-dismisses-two-more- 
brca-testing-patent-lawsuits-against-labcorp-ambry [https://perma.cc/3BVE-CNNM]; see 
also In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that certain inventions that closely implicate the information 
contained in genomic DNA are not patentable). 
 283.  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 
(2012); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Medical-Process Patents—Monopolizing 
the Delivery of Health Care, 355 N. ENG. J. MED. 2036, 2037–38 (2006). 
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health care reform, and the traditional reliance on states to regulate medical 
practice,284 these examples of federal regulation of medical practice raise 
questions about why federal oversight was accepted—or established—in 
these instances, and whether the current approach to federal regulation is 
sensible. 
Perhaps the most practical answer to the first question—why these 
examples of federal oversight were accepted—is that, in many of the 
instances in which the impact on medical practice was recognized, it was 
also argued that that the law at issue did not, in fact, regulate medical 
practice.  In other words, it was argued that notwithstanding the ways that 
these federal programs influence medicine, these federal programs are 
consistent with the conventional view that states regulate medical practice.  
For instance, in hearings before a Senate Subcommittee prior to the CSA’s 
enactment, the director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
within the Department of Justice assured lawmakers that the CSA was “in 
no way intended to authorize the Attorney General to regulate the practice 
of medicine, nor will it have this effect.”285  Likewise, in hearings about 
the 1962 amendments to the FDCA that authorized the FDA to review the 
effectiveness of drugs, the AMA spokesperson’s concern that this new 
authority would interfere with medical practice was characterized by 
others speaking at the hearing as “specious.”286  The legislative history for 
FDAAA suggests that Congress did not discuss the impact of REMS on 
medical practice when enacting the law.  But when the FDA implemented 
regulations in 1992 to create “RiskMAPs”—risk mitigation programs that 
were similar to REMS287—it responded to comments asserting that 
RiskMAPs “interfere with the practice[] of medicine” by characterizing 
the regulations as “permit[ing], in exceptional cases, approval of drugs 
with restrictions so that the drugs may be available for prescribing and 
dispensing,” rather than “interfering with physician or pharmacy practice.”288  
And, as noted above, the Medicare statute includes a provision explicitly 
disavowing any intent to regulate medical practice.289 
 
 284.  See supra section II. 
 285.  1970 CSA Senate Hearing, supra note 171. 
 286.  Harris, The Real Voice-II, supra note 196, at 146. 
 287.  See, e.g., DRAFT REMS GUIDANCE, supra note 201, at 3–5. 
 288.  New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated 
Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58942, 58951–52 (Dec. 11, 1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 
314 & 601), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2003-06-11/pdf/03-14621.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/SZF7-E28P]. 
 289.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2014). 
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Denying that federal programs control medical practice may be politically 
useful because of the history of state regulation and of opposition to 
federal oversight.  It gives Congress and administrative agencies cover 
from opposition grounded in concern about federal, rather than state, 
regulation, and allows them to make an argument that the particular 
federal program at issue is consistent with the traditional division of labor 
between the states and the federal government.  But it also requires 
lawmakers and administrative agencies to obfuscate the impact that these 
federal laws have on medical practice.  Transparency in governance is 
considered to be “among the pantheon of great political virtues,”290 because 
it facilitates democratic accountability and the better implementation of 
laws.291  Obfuscating the federal government’s role in overseeing medicine 
is, thus, undesirable, particularly at a time when the White House has 
emphasized the value transparency in government.292  Moreover, the need 
for rhetoric denying federal influence over medicine in areas that it exists 
suggests that the current approach to federal oversight is not the most 
sensible one. 
In addition to the political explanation for why the federal government 
was able to implement measures to influence medical practice in these 
examples, another reason that the above examples of federal oversight 
were established may be that Congress focused on issues that were—or 
were perceived to be—of national concern.  For example, Congress 
prohibited off-label use of HGH after U.S.,293 and international,294 scandals 
about athletes using performance-enhancing drugs sparked widespread 
concern in the United States.295  At the time Congress enacted the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act, more than half of states had already enacted laws 
 
 290.  Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888 (2006).  
While scholars have critiqued the concept of transparency and noted certain drawbacks 
associated with the implementation of open government laws in the United States, such 
critiques would not apply to this kind of obfuscation of the federal government’s role. 
 291.  See, e.g., Robert G. Vaughn, Transparency in the Administration of Laws: The 
Relationship Between Differing Justifications for Transparency and Differing Views of 
Administrative Law, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 969, 970 (2011) (describing the justifications 
for transparency). 
 292.  See Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
 293.  See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text. 
 294.  See Tim Keeney, Ben Johnson: Is 1988 Olympics Scandal Biggest of All Time?, 
BLEACHER REPORT (Oct. 9, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1365158-ben-
johnson-is-1988-olympics-scandal-biggest-of-all-time [http://perma.cc/52C3-DETV. 
 295.  See, e.g., Abuse of Steroids in Amateur and Professional Athletics: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990). 
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attempting to ban partial-birth abortions,296 suggesting this procedure may 
have been of national concern.  Further, the enactment of the 1962 law 
authorizing the FDA to review drugs’ efficacy followed a well-publicized 
public health scare, when the FDA refused to approve a drug called 
thalidomide that was later linked to severe birth defects, highlighting 
drugs’ potential for affecting the nation’s public health.297 
Although these federal efforts were aimed at problems of national interest, 
the overall approach to federal oversight of medicine is haphazard.  It may 
be the case that the federal government only intervenes when issues of 
national concern are at stake, but the federal government does not consistently 
intervene in such circumstances, which leads to inconsistent and problematic 
public health policy.  The deadly 2012 outbreak of fungal meningitis that 
was linked to the state-regulated practice of drug compounding, and the 
enduring idea, even after the outbreak, that the federal government should 
not regulate compounding that constitutes medical practice298 illustrates 
that the federal government does not consistently step in to address medical 
practice problems of national significance, and that the conventional view 
on the appropriate role for the federal government can lead to questionable 
public health policy. 
In sum, both political rhetoric denying that federal laws interfere with 
medical practice, and the national implications of the issues that federal 
laws have addressed, likely enabled the federal government to establish 
oversight of the areas of medical practice identified in the examples in this 
section.  But this approach to federal oversight of medicine is opaque and 
lacks a coherent underlying principle, which leads to inconsistent and 
problematic policy. 
IV.  WHEN FEDERAL REGULATION IS WARRANTED 
Given that federal regulation of medicine already exists and is generally 
lawful, but the scope of that federal oversight is currently inconsistently 
and ineffectively defined, the question becomes one long debated in many 
areas of U.S. policy: under what circumstances should the federal 
 
 296.  See, e.g., Nancy Kubasek & Daniel Tagliarina, Failed Lessons of History: The 
Predictable Shortcomings of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 159, 163 (2006). 
 297.  See, e.g., DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL 
IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 229–30, 238–40 (2010). 
 298.  See supra notes 1–6 and 11–15 and accompanying text. 
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government exert its authority?299  This Article proposes that federal regulation 
of medical practice is warranted when medical practice causes or contributes 
to a national public health problem that states cannot address. 
A.  The Case for Federal Regulation 
Scholars and courts have attributed numerous merits to state-based 
regulatory schemes,300 and scholars have identified a “general presumption 
in favor of decentralization.”301  One common argument is that “state 
governments limit the likelihood of federal tyranny.”302  Another is that, 
similar to competition in private markets, competition between states for 
“resident-taxpayers” may encourage states to provide optimal levels of 
regulation.303  State regulation also may allow greater political participation.304  
David L. Shapiro explained, “to the extent the electorate is small, and 
elected representatives are thus more immediately accountable to individuals 
and their concerns, government is brought closer to the people, and democratic 
ideals are more fully realized.”305  Decentralized regulation may enable 
experimentation and innovation, with the states functioning as “laboratories 
for new ideas,”306 and accommodate cultural and local diversity that would 
be threatened by national uniformity.307  In areas that have traditionally 
 
 299.  Cf. Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 
1734 (2011) (“The constitutional dispute [about the PPACA] is part of a larger argument 
that is perhaps America’s oldest: what is the proper role of the federal government?”). 
 300.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Abigail R. Moncrieff, 
Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 879 (2009). 
 301.  Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: Federal 
Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 199, 
205 (2011); see also Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal 
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 536 (1997) (“My 
starting point is a rebuttable presumption in favor of decentralization.”). 
 302.  Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 526 
(1995); see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1500 (1987) (“The most important reason offered by the 
defenders of state sovereignty was that state and local governments are better protectors 
of liberty.”). 
 303.  See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Moncrieff, supra note 300, at 869; Charles M. 
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418–20 (1956). 
 304.  See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Chemerinsky, supra note 302, at 525; Barry 
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389 (1997); Moncrieff, supra note 
300, at 879–81. 
 305.  DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91–92 (1995). 
 306.  Chemerinsky, supra note 302, at 525; McConnell, supra note 302, at 1499; see 
also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“[Decentralization] allows for more innovation and 
experimentation in government . . . .”). 
 307.  See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Friedman, supra note 304, at 401–02; McConnell, 
supra note 302, at 1493. 
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been regulated by states, continuing state regulation may retain the 
expertise of the institutions that are most experienced, and provide 
stakeholders predictability.308  Finally, there may be less partisan gridlock 
at the state level than there currently is at the federal level, which may 
enable state lawmakers to more quickly implement new laws and policies 
than federal lawmakers can. 
But scholars have also identified several advantages of federal regulation, 
including addressing interstate issues that create externalities, providing 
uniformity or coordination, preventing a “race to the bottom” among the 
states that threatens public welfare, and providing greater resources or 
expertise than the states possess.309  The presumption in favor of 
decentralization, thus, “can be overcome . . . by demonstrating the potential 
benefits of federal intervention in a specific instance.”310  A federal 
scheme need not deliver all possible benefits to be justified—one strong 
merit may be sufficient to “tip” the scales in favor of federal regulation.311  
And in the specific context of medical practice, there are several potential 
benefits of federal regulation. 
Despite the continuing narrative that medical practice is an individualized 
and local endeavor,312 it can easily contribute to problems that cross state 
boundaries and require nationally coordinated or uniform solutions.313  
The fall 2012 outbreak of fungal meningitis, caused by drugs compounded 
at a Massachusetts pharmacy that were shipped to patients in twenty-three 
states, provides a vivid example.314  As early as April 2011, Colorado 
recognized a problem with the pharmacy’s compounded drugs and 
blocked sales of its products in the state.315  Even though Colorado notified 
Massachusetts and the FDA, other states failed to take action to prevent 
 
 308.  See Moncrieff, supra note 300, at 879–81. 
 309.  See, e.g., Robert Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective 
on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate 
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 594–600 (2008); Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of 
Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 227 (2012). 
 310.  Adler, supra note 301, at 205.  Scholars have questioned whether state-based 
regulatory schemes do, in fact, provide these benefits.  See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 
302, at 255. 
 311.  See Stein, supra note 309, at 227. 
 312.  See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 313.  Cf. King, supra note 24, at 329 (describing the collective-action problem of the 
states); McConnell, supra note 302, at 1500 (“Externalities present the principal 
countervailing consideration in favor of centralized government . . . .”). 
 314.  See, e.g., Outterson, DQSA, supra note 13, at 97. 
 315.  See id. 
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the pharmacy’s compounded drugs from reaching patients within their 
borders—there was no coordinated response to the problem.316  Additionally, 
the 2012 outbreak was not an isolated event; it might have been anticipated 
by a well-coordinated national system.  In 2013 researchers identified 
eleven other similar outbreaks, between 2000 and the 2012 outbreak, caused 
by sterile drugs compounded outside of hospital settings, eight of which 
involved patients receiving compounded drugs across state lines.317 
Interstate problems, and the need for national coordination or uniformity, 
have prompted scholars and commentators to call for federal regulation of 
various aspects of medical practice.  For instance, Michael S. Young and 
Rachel K. Alexander have argued that a federal medical licensing system 
should be adopted because state licensure burdens practitioners “who 
work in this . . . extremely mobile society, who travel interstate, who treat 
patients from other states, or who participate in such activities as 
telemedicine.”318  Abigail Moncrieff has called for federalizing the medical 
malpractice system to correct for interstate externalities created by a 
decentralized system.319  Scholars have also proposed federalizing health 
systems that are currently decentralized, which would amount to increased 
indirect federal regulation of medical practice to solve interstate problems.  
Nicole Huberfeld, for example, has argued for federalizing Medicaid to 
“create a more coherent, consistent, and equal program.”320 
There are compelling public health reasons, in addition to the need to 
address interstate problems, for federal schemes for medical practice.  
Regulatory efforts that require significant scientific expertise may be 
more efficiently and effectively carried out at the federal level.  Jaime S. 
King, for example, proposed federally regulating the use of assisted 
reproductive technologies in part for this reason.321  It also may be desirable 
 
 316.  See id. 
 317.  See Catherine Staes et al., Description of Outbreaks of Health-Care Associated 
Infections Related to Compounding Pharmacies, 2000–12, 70 AM. J. HEALTH-SYSTEM 
PHARMACY e29, e30–31 (2013). 
 318.  Michael S. Young & Rachel K. Alexander, Recognizing the Nature of American 
Medical Practice: An Argument for Adopting Federal Medical Licensure, 13 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 145, 166–67 (2010); see also George Annas, Congress, Controlled 
Substances, and Physician-Assisted Suicide—Elephants in Mouseholes, 354 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1079–1084 (2006) (opining that state licensure of medical practitioners is a “relic”).  
Other scholars, however, have argued for improving coordination between the states rather 
than federalizing medical licensure.  See, e.g., Kocher et al., supra note 131 (“We believe 
that . . . states should adopt mutual recognition agreements in which they honor each 
other’s physician licenses.”). 
 319.  See Moncrieff, supra note 300, at 847–48. 
 320.  Huberfeld, supra note 53, at 473. 
 321.  See King, supra note 24, at 329, 338; see also Heled, supra note 24, at 304–07 
(making recommendations for the FDA regulation of the genetic aspects of donated reproductive 
tissue). 
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to federally govern certain aspects of medical practice to ensure a minimum 
level of protection for the public health and patients’ safety.322  Perhaps in 
recognition of this possibility, Rebecca Dresser and Joel Frader argued 
Congress and the FDA should take a “more affirmative” role in overseeing 
off-label uses of drugs to prevent harm.323  Lastly, the federal government 
has greater financial resources than the states do, which permits the federal 
government to make longer-term investments and establish broader regulatory 
schemes than the states can.324  National public health problems may 
require the financial resources of the federal government and the long-term 
commitment those resources enable.  As technology and scientific 
understanding advance, it may become increasingly likely that solutions 
to public health problems will outstrip states’ abilities and resources.  Federal 
resources might be used to establish federal initiatives that directly regulate 
medical practice or, if direct federal control is not needed, might be given 
to the states, with conditions intended to influence medical practice. 
In fact, in many cases, federal oversight of medical practice need not 
wholly supplant state regulation to gain the benefits of federal oversight.  
It is true that for certain problems a single, uniform policy will be necessary 
or useful, and, accordingly it may be desirable to establish federal oversight 
that preempts divergent state oversight in those circumstances.  For example, 
permitting individual states to make independent approval decisions about 
medical products could undermine the FDA’s ability to protect and 
promote the public health, and create uncertainty for industry stakeholders 
that invest in and develop new medical products.325  But in many cases, 
even when a national public health problem has emerged, a wholesale 
federal takeover of medical practice regulation may not be necessary—
overlapping authorities can be beneficial, and regulators can learn from 
 
 322.  See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 301, at 544; cf. Noah, supra note 25, at 154 (“[T]he 
federal government should not feel shy about interfering with the practice of medicine . . . 
to ensure patient safety.”). 
 323.  Dresser & Frader, supra note 45, at 483.  Philip M. Rosoff and Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman have also proposed heightened regulation of off-label prescribing, but 
remain agnostic as to whether such regulation should be federal.  See Philip M. Rosoff & 
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Case for Legal Regulation of Physicians’ Off-Label 
Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 690–91 (2011). 
 324.  See Sage & Hyman, supra note 24, at 823. 
 325.  Cf. Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2 (D. 
Mass. Apr. 15, 2014) (enjoining a Massachusetts banon a FDA-approved drug—which 
was framed as a medical practice law— because it was preempted by the FDCA). 
ZETTLER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/27/2015  1:55 PM 
 
482 
each other’s’ experiences.326  In sum, federally regulating medical practice—
either directly and indirectly—may offer comparative advantages over 
sole state regulation for interstate problems, problems that may require 
greater resources and scientific expertise than states can offer, and areas 
in which ensuring a minimum level of protection for patients and the 
public health is particularly important. 
B.  A Public Health Framework for Federal Regulation 
Rather than considering the merits of federalizing a particular aspect of 
medical practice oversight, this Article proposes that federal regulation is 
generally warranted when medical practice causes or contributes to a 
national public health problem that the states cannot address. Because 
public health problems, by definition, occur on a community or population 
level,327 coordinated, federal efforts are likely necessary to effectively address 
national public health problems.  However, when the states have already 
established essentially consistent and well-functioning schemes to regulate 
areas of medical practice that implicate the national public health, there 
may be no need for the federal government to intervene.  Additionally, 
depending on the particular problem, federal oversight need not preempt 
all state oversight.  By limiting the proposal to circumstances in which 
there is both a national public health concern and a lack of adequate state 
oversight, this framework attempts to strike the right balance between 
expanding federal options for addressing public health problems, avoiding 
ineffective federal interference with medical practice, and preserving 
well-functioning state regulation consistent with federalism values.  
Additionally, by focusing on national issues, this proposal is consistent 
with, although not identical to, the circumstances in which the federal 
government has been able to implement medical practice regulation.328 
Considering whether the six examples of federal medical practice regulation 
provided in section III.A would be warranted under this framework helps to 
clarify it.  The CSA, the FDA’s pre-market review of medical products 
and REMS requirements, and Medicare coverage decisions would all be 
warranted federal regulatory schemes under this framework.  In determining 
whether a particular law is intended to address a national public health 
problem, it is helpful to consider Congressional intent, as well as public 
health agencies’ positions on the problem addressed by the law.  Congress 
established each of these regulatory schemes, at least in part, to address a 
national public health problem, and agencies have endorsed the public health 
 
 326.  See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 52, at 285. 
 327.  See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 49, at 4. 
 328.  See supra section III.A. 
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nature of these schemes.329  The CSA and the FDA’s pre-market review 
of medical products and REMS requirements, by virtue of addressing 
scientifically complex problems associated with products that cross state 
lines, address problems that states are unlikely to effectively regulate.  
Likewise, states do not possess sufficient resources for a program like 
Medicare, and to administer such a program, the federal government must 
make coverage decisions. 
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act and the provision prohibiting off-
label use of HGH, on the other hand, would not be appropriate exercises 
of federal authority because neither law was enacted to address a national 
public health problem.  The Congressional findings in the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act suggest that Congress enacted the law to “express[] 
respect for the dignity of human life,” and protect the medical profession 
from reputational harms associated with performing what Congress deemed 
a “gruesome” procedure, rather than to address a public health concern 
about the safety or effectiveness of the procedure itself.330  Similarly, to 
the extent that Congress prohibited off-label use of HGH to address cheating 
in sports, rather than to solve a public health problem, that prohibition is 
an unwarranted exercise of federal authority.331  When regulation hinges 
on particular values for which there is no compelling public health need 
for national uniformity, rather than on addressing public health problems, 
states might be better positioned to account for cultural and local diversity 
in views. 
1.  Advantages of the Framework 
This framework offers several advantages.  First, the position that the 
federal government does not regulate medical practice is simply incorrect, 
 
 329.  See, e.g., Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1236, 1242 (identifying the prevention of drug abuse as one 
purpose of the Act, which includes the CSA); OBERLANDER, supra note 47, at 17–35 (describing 
Medicare’s goal to bring medical care for the elderly into the mainstream); Psaty & Korn, 
supra note 201, at 2185 (explaining the public health rationale for enacting the REMS 
provisions); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., What We Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
aboutfda/whatwedo/ [http://perma.cc/MVV8-D996] (“FDA is responsible for protecting 
the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy and security of human . . . drugs, biological 
products, medical devices . . . .”). 
 330.  Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105 § 2(14)(J), 117 
Stat. 1201, 1205; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007). 
 331.  See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
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and the distinction between regulating medical practice and medical 
products is porous.  The CSA, the provision in the FDCA prohibiting off-
label use of HGH, the FDA’s premarket review of medical products, and 
FDA-required REMS are all examples of medical product regulation that 
also reaches medical practice.332  To the extent arguments against federal 
regulation are premised on the notion that the federal government plays 
no role—or historically has never played a role—in regulating medical 
practice, those arguments are demonstrably wrong.  Dispensing with the 
truism that the federal government abstains from regulating medical 
practice for a framework that explicitly acknowledges the role that the 
federal government plays will permit more transparency about that role.  
Additionally, by proposing a general framework to guide decisions about 
when to exert federal authority over medical practice, this framework 
should promote a more principled approach to federal oversight. 
Second, this framework ought not to run afoul of traditional notions of 
federalism.  While some may oppose this framework on the ideological 
ground that greater federal power is inherently bad,333 state regulation of 
medical practice arose at a time when medical practice was decidedly 
local in nature—which is no longer the case.334  “Federalism is rooted in 
the belief that issues that are not national in scope or significance are most 
appropriately addressed by the level of government closest to the 
people.”335  But “Our Federalism” does not require absolute deference to 
states’ authority; instead, it envisions a role for the federal government in 
solving national problems.336  By limiting federal intervention to activities 
causing or contributing to a national public health problem that states are 
not equipped to address, the federal role conceived by this framework is 
consistent with “Our Federalism.”  It recognizes the comparative advantages 
that states may have in some circumstances, and does not call for federal 
preemption of all medical practice oversight, even in situations in which 
medical practice contributes to a national public health problem.  For 
example, while a federal review of the safety and effectiveness of infertility 
treatments and practices, such as in vitro fertilization (IVF) techniques, 
would likely be more efficient and expert than duplicative state efforts,337 
 
 332.  See discussion in sections III.A.1.a and b, and 2.a and b. 
 333.  Cf. Huberfeld, supra note 53, at 435 (“[S]ome would oppose centralization [of 
Medicaid] on the ideological grounds that more federal government power is bad, and 
more state or local power is good.”).  
 334.  See, e.g., MOHR, supra note 23, at 9–21. 
 335.  Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999). 
 336.  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).  As Nicole Huberfeld explains, 
“Justice Black coined the phrase ‘Our Federalism’ in this case.”  Huberfeld, supra note 
53, at 454 n.112. 
 337.  See King, supra note 24, at 329–31, 338. 
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there may good reasons why certain practices differ among states.  Some 
states offer insurance coverage for infertility treatment, while others do 
not,338 and differences in insurance coverage may drive practitioners and 
patients to make different decisions about treatment, such as determining 
how many embryos to implant in a woman undergoing IVF.  Accordingly, 
while the federal government may be best able to regulate certain aspects 
of infertility treatments, states may have comparative advantages in 
regulating other aspects. 
Finally, insofar as the argument that the federal government should not 
regulate medical practice has limited the options that federal lawmakers 
seriously consider, this framework should open new possibilities for 
federal legal action to address serious public health problems.  As an 
example, Congress expressed concern about intruding on state regulation 
of traditional drug compounding through the Drug Quality and Security 
Act, and that concern, arguably, drove Congress to provide more limited 
federal oversight of compounding than it could have in the Act.339  Under 
this framework, however, federally regulating drug compounding—regardless 
of whether it constitutes medical practice—would be considered appropriate 
because it contributes to a national public health problem that states cannot 
address. 
2.  Addressing Critiques 
Although the proposed framework offers advantages, it may also be 
susceptible to several critiques.  First, proposing that the federal government 
regulate only those activities that cause or contribute to a national public 
health problem that states cannot address might trade one line-drawing 
problem for another.  While the line between regulating medical practice 
versus medical products is not readily apparent, some scholars have criticized 
the notion of distinguishing between individual and public health,340 and 
it may be difficult to determine what constitutes a national public health 
problem versus a local or individual health problem.  It is likely to be even 
more challenging to determine what is both a national public health problem 
and a problem that the states cannot address.  This framework, thus, will 
be most helpful at two ends of a spectrum—when it is very clear there is 
 
 338.  See State Infertility Insurance Laws, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., http://www. 
asrm.org/insurance.aspx [http://perma.cc/JQ92-LL23] (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
 339.  See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. 
 340.  See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 49, at 3–4; Arah, supra note 49, at 235. 
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a national public health problem that states cannot address, and when it is 
very clear those circumstances do not exist.  But determining what constitutes 
a national problem for which state regulation will be inadequate is a 
question we routinely trust to Congress and administrative agencies in 
contexts other than medicine.341  Consequently, this framework tasks 
Congress and administrative agencies with an inquiry that is within their 
institutional expertise.  Because line-drawing problems are difficult, if not 
impossible, to completely eradicate, focusing Congress and administrative 
agencies’ attention on inquiries within their institutional expertise, and 
providing them with principled bases on which to make their decisions, 
may be the most viable solution. 
Second, there may be concerns that acknowledging and, in some 
circumstances, expanding a federal role in overseeing medical practice 
will lead to the government curtailing individual liberties in the name of 
public health.  It is true that there is a history of governments using, or 
trying to use, public health authorities in this way.  For example, in the 
early- and mid-twentieth century, a majority of states passed laws permitting 
or mandating the sterilization of mentally ill persons, or other persons 
deemed “socially inadequate.”342  In the early 1990s, when mortality from 
HIV/AIDS was rising and treatment options were very limited, Senator 
Jesse Helms proposed requiring medical practitioners to be tested for HIV 
and criminalizing the practice of medicine by HIV positive individuals.343  
More recently, in the name of preventing the transmission of Ebola, local 
schools implemented policies that excluded children who, according to 
the CDC, were not at a high enough risk to merit exclusion.344  Although 
the framework proposed in this Article will not eliminate the possibility 
that civil liberties will be curtailed in the name of the public health, the 
risk of such abuses already exists under the current framework.345  To the 
 
 341.  Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Our (National) Federalism, 123 YALE L. J. 1996, 1998 
(2014) (describing Congress’s role and noting “federalism now comes from federal 
statutes”); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 
570 (2011) (“Critical decisions about the actual scope of state powers and autonomy will 
be made not in Congress or in the courts, but in the halls of agencies . . . .”). 
 342.  See PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL ix–xiv (2008); Paul A. Lombardo, Public Health or 
AIDS Hysteria? Helms’s Proposal, BIOLAW, Dec. 1991, at S:681, S:683 [hereinafter 
Lombardo, Public Health or AIDS Hysteria?]. 
 343.  See Lombardo, Public Health or AIDS Hysteria?, supra note 337, at S:681. 
 344.  See, e.g., Wendy Hensel, Civil Rights Have a Place in Conversation, ATLANTA 
J. CONST., Nov. 21, 2014, at A16. 
 345.  See, e.g., supra notes 342–44 and accompanying text.  In addition, depending 
on one’s view of abortion, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act may serve as evidence of 
the federal government curtailing individual liberties in the name of medical practice 
regulation, rather than in the name of public health. 
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extent the proposed framework enables an expansion of federal oversight 
of medical practice, it is not clear that the federal government is more 
prone to these abuses than state governments are.  Moreover, similar to 
line-drawing problems, governments using public health authorities to 
curtail civil liberties may be a particularly difficult problem to eradicate.  
The framework proposed in this Article does not seem likely to exacerbate 
the problem—as its purpose is not to expand federal regulation per se, but 
rather to make that regulation more transparent and coherent. 
Third, federal regulation under the framework proposed in this Article 
may restrict medical practitioners’ flexibility, as well as stifle policy 
experimentation by state governments.346  The framework is likely to limit 
medical practitioners’ discretion in clinically meaningful ways by requiring 
that, in certain circumstances, care be provided to patients not based on a 
practitioner’s judgment about that individual patient’s best interests, but 
instead based on a public health policy goal.  As an example, the DEA’s 
existing scheme for regulating pain medication has been criticized for 
making it difficult for practitioners to treat individual patients with legitimate 
needs for such drugs, in the name of addressing the prescription drug abuse 
problem.347  However, that regulation under the framework proposed in 
this Article might result in patients receiving non-individualized, or even 
suboptimal, care in certain circumstances should not necessarily weigh 
against implementing it.  The framework would change clinical practice 
only in those circumstances in which a judgment has been made that the 
public health should be prioritized over an individual’s health.348  Indeed, 
courts and scholars have recognized that individual interests may be 
restrained when “the safety of the general public” demands it.349  Likewise, 
 
 346.  See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 302, at 525; McConnell, supra note 302, at 
1499. 
 347.  See, e.g., Ballantyne, supra note 21, at 812. 
 348.  Moreover, the interests of the public health and the interests of the individual 
patient may be aligned in certain situations.  For example, prescribing an antibiotic for a 
patient that has a viral condition benefits neither the individual patient nor the public 
health.  See section IV.C.1.a., infra. 
 349.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 25 S. Ct. 358, 362 (1905); see, e.g., James F. Childress 
et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 170, 171–72 
(2002); Wendy E. Parmet, Valuing the Unidentified: The Potential of Public Health Law, 
53 JURIMETRICS J. 255, 265 (2013). 
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when state experimentation leads to a “race to the bottom” that threatens 
the public health, it would be reasonable to limit such experimentation.350 
Related to concerns about federal regulation of medical practice 
prioritizing public health over individual health, there might be concerns 
about supplanting medical practitioners’ expert judgments with those of 
federal lawmakers.351  In other words, there might be concerns that this 
framework will permit federal lawmakers to establish unwise medical 
policies that will be difficult to modify.  But in certain instances, federal 
actors may be better positioned than individual practitioners, professional 
organizations, or state governments to detect problems arising from 
medical practice and determine appropriate policies to address such 
problems.  The FDA’s authority to require REMS offers an example.  
Risks associated with certain uses of drugs, and plans to mitigate those 
risks, may require the comprehensive data and scientific expertise of the 
FDA.  Additionally, even if this framework enables the federal government’s 
role to expand over time, a federal regulatory scheme would not necessarily 
lead to more interference with practitioner discretion than a state-based 
scheme—because states can also exert substantial control over many 
aspects of medical practice.352 
Fourth, because federal authorities are more distant than state authorities, 
enforcing federal medical practice requirements may be challenging.353  
There is some evidence that existing efforts to federally regulate medical 
practice currently face enforcement problems.  As an example, some 
commentators estimate that thirty percent of prescriptions for HGH are 
off-label, despite the prohibition on such prescriptions.354  Questions also 
have been raised about whether the FDA can effectively enforce REMS 
requirements.355  Although federal enforcement difficulties certainly exist, 
it is not clear that federal authorities have worse enforcement records than 
state authorities with more limited resources.  Additionally, federal 
requirements may have an expressive value that a patchwork of state laws 
does not.  Especially because federal oversight of medical practice is 
considered unusual, federally regulating a particular area of medical practice 
 
 350.  Cf. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 309, at 597–98 (describing the “race to the 
bottom” phenomenon in the context of climate change policy). 
 351.  See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 149. 
 352.  See id. 
 353.  Cf. Sage & Hyman, supra note 24, at 823; McConnell, supra note 302, at 1508. 
 354.  See, e.g., Mary Lee Vance, Can Growth Hormone Prevent Aging?, 348 N. ENG. 
J. MED. 779, 780 (2003). 
 355.  See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FDA 
LACKS COMPREHENSIVE DATA TO DETERMINE WHETHER RISK EVALUATION AND 
MITIGATION STRATEGIES IMPROVE DRUG SAFETY 22 (2013), available at https://oig.hhs. 
gov/oei/reports/oei-04-11-00510.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6X5-NHH5]. 
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may underscore that area’s importance to the public health, educate 
practitioners and patients about its importance, and help shift social norms.356 
Finally, instead of acknowledging a federal role in regulating medical 
practice, one might propose eliminating existing areas of federal oversight 
to preserve state primacy in regulating medical practice.  That solution, 
however, is not only impractical—it would be politically impossible to 
dissolve many federal health programs such as Medicare357—it would 
have disastrous public health effects.  It, for example, would require 
dismantling modern FDA regulation of medical products, and reverting 
to an era of widespread marketing of fraudulent or adulterated drugs and 
devices.358  As a series of articles in The New Yorker reported, before the 
FDA was authorized to review drugs’ effectiveness in 1962, “it was 
frequently impossible for even a specialist to find out what a given drug 
might do for a patient,” a number of drugs “had little efficacy at all,” “a 
good part of the advertising was misleading—in fact, [] some of it was 
downright fraudulent,” and it took the government “ten years to ban 
Hoxey’s Cancer Cure—a worthless concoction that sick people spent 
three to four hundred dollars per treatment for, when they might have been 
saved by surgery or X-ray therapy.”359 
C.  Applying the Framework: Antibiotic Resistance 
As discussed above, this Article proposes that the federal government 
should regulate medical practice when it causes or contributes to a national 
public health problem that the states cannot address.  To illustrate how this 
framework could work in practice and open new options for addressing 
public health crises, this section discusses one example for which the 
framework would clearly support federal regulation: the problem of 
antibiotic resistance.360  This section first argues that medical practice that 
 
 356.  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2028 (1996) (describing various expressive values of law). 
 357.  See Moncrieff, supra note 300, at 882–83. 
 358.  Cf. CARPENTER, supra note 297, at 73–118 (describing the drug market before 
the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938). 
 359.  Richard Harris, The Annals of Legislation: The Real Voice-I, THE NEW YORKER, 
Mar. 14, 1964, at 63–64; Richard Harris, The Annals of Legislation: The Real Voice-III, 
THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 1964, at 50. 
 360.  The problem is also characterized more broadly as antimicrobial resistance 
because, in addition to bacteria, other microbes—fungi, viruses, and parasites—have 
developed resistance to existing drugs.  See, e.g., About Antimicrobial Resistance: A Brief 
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contributes to antibiotic resistance is an appropriate candidate for federal 
regulation, and second considers how federal regulation might be 
implemented. 
1.  Antibiotic Resistance Fits the Framework 
Medical practice that contributes to antibiotic resistance is an appropriate 
target for federal regulation because antibiotic resistance represents a 
serious threat to the national public health that the states cannot effectively 
address. 
a.  The National Antibiotic Resistance Problem 
Congress and major public health organizations have recognized drug-
resistant bacteria as a grave national—and international—public health 
problem.361  The CDC reports that each year at least 2 million people in 
the United States are infected with drug-resistant bacteria, 23,000 die as a 
direct result of those infections, and many more die from conditions that 
are complicated by the infections.362  The World Economic Forum estimates 
that 80,000 people in China, and 25,000 people in Europe, die each year 
from hospital-acquired infections with drug-resistant bacteria.363  And the 
World Health Organization (WHO) reports “very high rates” of antibiotic 
resistance worldwide.364 
There is good reason to be concerned about antibiotic resistant bacteria.  
Antibiotics provide treatments for infections that are serious and life-
threatening, such as sepsis, as well as common illnesses, such as strep 
throat, that are generally viewed as low risk but were untreatable and 
 
Overview, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
drugresistance/about.html [http://perma.cc/DM5Z-RMTZ] (last updated Sept. 16, 2013). 
 361.  See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S4610-30 (daily ed. June 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. 
Mikulski); WORLD HEALTH ORG., ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: GLOBAL REPORT ON 
SURVEILLANCE 2014 9–30 (2014) [hereinafter WHO REPORT], available at http:// 
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/112642/1/9789241564748_eng.pdf?ua=1 [http://perma.cc/ 
3SHU-88EH]; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 
THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 11 (2013) [hereinafter CDC REPORT], available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/T9NG-4HZ5]; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: THE JUDICIOUS 
USE OF MEDICALLY IMPORTANT ANTIMICROBIAL DRUGS IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS 3 
(Apr. 13, 2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/animal veterinary/guidance 
complianceenforcement/guidanceforindustry/ucm216936.pdf [http://perma.cc/4ZP2-EWFL]. 
 362.  CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 11. 
 363.  WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 30 (8th ed. 2013) [hereinafter WEF 
REPORT], available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2013.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/JZ2R-VNYR]. 
 364.  WHO REPORT, supra note 361, at x. 
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sometimes fatal before antibiotics were developed.365  Antibiotics also 
enable treatments for conditions other than infections.  For example, 
chemotherapy and surgery pose infection risks, and would be substantially 
more dangerous without effective antibiotics.366  The threat of antibiotic 
resistance, thus, is not just that we will lose the ability to treat infections, 
but also that we will lose the capacity to safely treat many other diseases 
and conditions.  Indeed, the CDC concluded that the consequences of 
failing to act to stop the spread of drug-resistant bacteria are “potentially 
catastrophic,”367 the World Economic Forum cited drug-resistant bacteria 
as “arguably the greatest risk . . . to human health,”368 and the Director-
General of the WHO said “[a] post-antibiotic era means, in effect, an end 
to modern medicine as we know it.”369 
Antibiotic resistance arises because bacteria are living organisms that 
evolve and adapt to survive in their environments.370  Although any use of 
antibiotics selects for resistant bacteria by killing those that are not, misuse 
unnecessarily exacerbates this effect.371  Antibiotic misuse includes using 
antibiotics to promote animal growth.372  It also includes the medical use 
of antibiotics at doses too low to effectively cure an infection, for conditions 
that will not respond to antibiotics such as viral conditions, or for lengths 
 
 365.  See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 
1900-1999: Control of Infectious Diseases, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 621 
(July 30, 1999), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4829a1.htm [http://perma. 
cc/GGN5-K5UM]. 
 366.  See, e.g., WEF REPORT, supra note 363, at 30; CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 24. 
 367.  CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 6. 
 368.  WEF REPORT, supra note 363, at 28. 
 369.  Id. at 29. 
 370.  See Antimicrobial (Drug) Resistance, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NAT’L INST. OF 
ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/antimicrobialresistance/ 
understanding/pages/causes.aspx [http://perma.cc/SER6-EG42] (last updated Dec. 21, 2011). 
 371.  See Brad Spellberg et al., The Future of Antibiotics and Resistance, 368 NEW. 
ENG. J. MED. 299, 299–300 (2013). 
 372.  Because using antibiotics in livestock feed does not involve medical practice, it 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  It does, however, play a significant role in contributing 
to the antibiotic resistance problem.  See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PHASING 
OUT CERTAIN ANTIBIOTIC USE IN FARM ANIMALS (2013), available at http://www.fda. 
gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM378197.pdf [http://perma.cc/269U- 
CW5E] (discussing a voluntary plan to phase out the use of certain antibiotics in farm 
animals in an effort to slow down antimicrobial resistance). 
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of time shorter or longer than necessary to cure an infection.373  Even 
without exposure to antibiotics, some level of resistance will occur in 
nature.374  In 2012, scientists reported finding drug resistance in bacteria, 
including resistance to synthetic antibiotics not created until the twentieth 
century, in a cave that had been isolated from the surface for at least four 
million years,.375 
Antibiotic resistance is fundamentally a national and international problem, 
both in scope and significance.376  Antibiotic-resistant bacteria can quickly 
and easily spread across state and national boundaries.377  For example, 
drug-resistant gonorrhea was first identified in Hawaii and California in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, but had spread throughout the United 
States by 2007.378  Behaviors that may seem local in nature, such as 
unprotected sexual activity, or more relevant to this Article, practitioners’ 
antibiotic prescribing decisions, can contribute to the development of 
antibiotic resistant bacteria capable of crossing state lines.379  In addition, 
such infections cost a tremendous amount of money.  The CDC estimates 
that drug-resistant infections cost the United States as much as $20 billion 
in direct health care expenses, and $35 billion in lost productivity.380 
b.  States Cannot Adequately Address the Problem 
Although a number of states have enacted laws intended to address 
medical practice that contributes to antibiotic resistance, state efforts are 
likely insufficient.381  State laws primarily focus on tracking infections.  
 
 373.  See CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 41–43; Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin 
Outterson, Fighting Antibiotic Resistance: Marrying New Financial Incentives, 29 HEALTH 
AFF. 1689, 1690 (2010). 
 374.  See Spellberg et al., supra note 371, at 300. 
 375.  See Kirandeep Bhullar et al., Antibiotic Resistance Is Prevalent in an Isolated 
Cave Microbiome, PLOS ONE, Apr. 2012, at 2. 
 376.  Although the problem is not confined to the United States, this Article focuses 
on the United States to illustrate how the framework for federally regulating medical practice 
could work in this country. 
 377.  See, e.g., CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 11; Sage & Hyman, supra note 24, 
at 824. 
 378.  See, e.g., Lauren F. Friedman, Super Gonorrhea Is on the Rise in the United 
States, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2014, 1:14 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/cipro 
floxacin-resistance-and-gonorrhea-incidence-2014-3#ixzz2vlzm8jzU [http://perma.cc/FC28- 
7UNW]. 
 379.  See CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 41–43. 
 380.  See id. at 11.  Likewise, the WHO reports that the international economic effects 
of antibiotic resistance are “disturbing.”  WHO REPORT, supra note 361, at xix.  Ten years 
ago, antibiotic resistance was projected “to cause a fall in real gross domestic product 
(GDP) of 0.4% to 1.6%, which translates into many billions of today’s dollars globally.”  
Id. 
 381.  See Sage & Hyman, supra note 24, at 824. 
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All fifty states require that certain diseases be reported to the state,382 with 
some requiring reporting of particular infections with antibiotic-resistant 
organisms.  For example, Arkansas requires that practitioners report 
infections with Vancomycin-resistant enterococci.383  States may voluntarily 
report such disease cases to the CDC for national aggregation and 
monitoring.384 
In addition to mandating reporting, several states have enacted laws 
explicitly aimed at preventing the spread of methicillin resistant staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA) or Multi-Drug Resistant Organisms (MDROs).385  The 
laws generally require that hospitals screen patients at risk for contracting 
MRSA or MDROs, and if a patient is infected, take steps to prevent the 
infection’s spread, such as isolating the patient and ensuring that hospital 
staff practice appropriate hygiene like hand washing.386  Although these 
requirements apply to hospitals, they indirectly regulate practitioner behaviors 
that contribute to the spread of drug-resistant bacteria. 
States efforts, however, have not included comprehensive laws to 
incentivize or require appropriate antibiotic prescribing.387  This gap is 
 
 382.  See, e.g. National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS), Data 
Collection and Reporting, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://wwwn. 
cdc.gov/nndss/script/DataCollection.aspx [http://perma.cc/E4VW-E6HQ] [hereinafter NNDSS]. 
 383. See Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) Mandatory Reportable Diseases List 
and Instructions, ARK. DEP’T OF HEALTH (Sept. 1, 2014), available at http://www. 
healthy.arkansas.gov/programsServices/epidemiology/Documents/ReportableDisease.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/J27Z-YHEJ].  Vancomycin is an important hospital-based antibiotic, and 
infections with vancomycin-resistant enterococci are associated with increased mortality.  
See, e.g., Establishing a List of Qualifying Pathogens Under the Food and Drug 
Administration Safety and Innovation Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 35155, 35162 (proposed June 12, 
2013); Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic 
Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 626 (2010). 
 384.  See NNDSS, supra note 382. 
 385.  See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.8 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 19a-490p (West 2010); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 330/7 (West 2013); 410 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/10 (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.585 (West 2010); 40 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 1303.403 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-269 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 70.41.430 (West 2011). 
 386.  See e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.8 (West 2014), 
 387.  Arizona restricts how optometrists, but not physicians, prescribe antibiotics.  
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1706 (2010).  In addition, a few states where Lyme disease is 
prevalent have expressly permitted licensed physicians to prescribe long-term antibiotic 
therapy for patients diagnosed with Lyme disease, suggesting that physicians in those 
states may have been subject to—or worried about—disciplinary actions from state medical 
boards for prescribing long-term courses of antibiotics.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-
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troubling because as many as fifty percent of antibiotics used in the United 
States are used inappropriately.388  With the pipeline for new antibiotics 
dwindling because antibiotics offer a lower return on investment than other 
classes of drugs, some have expressed concern that any limits on antibiotic 
prescribing—at the federal or state level—might reduce the potential 
profits that companies can hope to reap, leading to a further diminished 
antibiotic pipeline.389  There are, however, ways to address this concern 
that do not depend on increasing antibiotic sales by permitting dubious 
uses.  For example, this tension between the need to both incentivize 
antibiotic development and curtail inappropriate antibiotic uses might be 
resolved by de-linking antibiotic profits from antibiotic sales volume, as 
Kevin Outterson has proposed.390  Concerns about the antibiotic pipeline, 
therefore, do not support a permissive policy with respect to practitioners’ 
antibiotic prescribing decisions.  There may also be concerns that federal 
laws or regulations governing antibiotic prescribing decisions will not 
account for legitimate clinical exceptions to general prescribing rules.  It, 
however, may be possible to design laws or regulations with sufficient 
flexibility to allow for clinically important exceptions, or it may be worth 
accepting some risk that a few individual patients will receive suboptimal 
care to promote the public health through better antibiotic prescribing 
practices overall. 
In short, the existing, and incomplete, patchwork of state laws has not 
halted the spread of drug-resistant bacteria.  While legal efforts to regulate 
practitioners’ behaviors that contribute to resistance will not eliminate 
resistance, for such efforts to be most effective they must be nationally 
coordinated, and backed by resources that will enable long-term policies.391  
Thus, the states are not likely to effectively regulate medical practice that 
contributes to antibiotic resistance. Additionally, professional self-regulation 
does not seem to be effectively addressing practitioner behaviors that 
contribute to resistance.  For example, twenty-six organizations, including 
the American Academy of Pediatrics and the Infectious Diseases Society of 
America (IDSA), which represents health care professionals who specialize 
 
14m (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12DD (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 5-37.5-4 (West 2008). 
 388.  See CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 11. 
 389.  See, e.g., Richard P. Wenzel, The Antibiotic Pipeline—Challenges, Costs, and 
Values, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 523 (2004). 
 390.  See Kevin Outterson, New Business Models for Sustainable Antibiotics, in 
CENTRE ON GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY WORKING GROUP PAPERS, WORKING GROUPS ON 
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, PAPER 1 6 (Feb. 2014), available at http://www.chathamhouse. 
org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Global%20Health/0214SustainableAntibio
tics.pdf [http://perma.cc/CU94-JPFB]. 
 391.  Cf. Sage & Hyman, supra note 24, at 823. 
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in infectious diseases, have jointly worked to promote antibiotic stewardship 
among medical professionals.392  Nevertheless, as noted above, as many 
as fifty percent of the antibiotics prescribed in the United States continue 
to be inappropriately used.393 
2.  Implementing the Framework for Antibiotic Resistance 
The CDC has identified four goals for addressing the antibiotic resistance 
problem, the first three of which implicate aspects of medical practice that 
could be regulated under the framework proposed in this Article.  First, 
reducing misuse of antibiotics is “[p]erhaps the single most important 
action needed to greatly slow down the development and spread of 
antibiotic-resistant infections.”394  Second, tracking infections with drug-
resistant bacteria provides the opportunity to learn more about such 
infections, including whether there are particular risk factors for infection 
that can be mitigated in the future.395  Third, preventing infections with 
drug-resistant bacteria is critical because it reduces the need for antibiotic 
use, thereby helping to slow the development of resistance, and limits the 
spread of the drug-resistant bacteria themselves.396  Finally, new treatments 
for bacterial infections are needed.397 
Thus far, federal legal efforts have primarily focused on the fourth 
goal—developing new antibiotics.  For example, the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 included limited provisions 
intended to encourage antibiotic innovation, and specifically provided that 
the provisions did not “restrict, in any manner, the prescribing of 
antibiotics by physicians.”398  The Food and Drug Administration Safety 
and Innovation Act of 2012 included more extensive provisions—known 
as the Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) provisions—to 
encourage antibiotic development by providing certain drugs extended 
 
 392.  See Carolyne Krupa, 26 Organizations Team Up To Fight Antibiotic 
Resistance, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 26, 2012, http://www.amednews.com/article/20121126/ 
profession/311269933/6/ [http://perma.cc/UV9J-MCB9]. 
 393.  See CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 11. 
 394.  Id. at 31. 
 395.  See id. at 39. 
 396.  See id. at 32. 
 397.  See id. at 44. 
 398.  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85 
§§ 1111–1114, 121 Stat. 823, 976. 
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periods of marketing exclusivity and a fast-tracked FDA approval process.399  
The framework proposed in this Article would support federal legal action 
that moves beyond incentivizing antibiotic development, and focuses on 
the CDC goals that implicate medical practice. 
Federal regulation in these areas could be accomplished in three ways, 
the first of which would be for Congress to enact new legislation to 
directly regulate medical practice that contributes to resistance.  Legislation 
could prohibit practitioners from inappropriately prescribing or dispensing 
antibiotics, similar to the provision prohibiting off-label use of HGH.400  
Although a prohibition on inappropriately prescribing and dispensing 
antibiotics may not perfectly align with the FDA-approved labeling if 
there are medically appropriate uses that are not approved, such a prohibition 
could be added to the FDCA and enforced by the FDA, which already has 
experience enforcing the prohibition of HGH’s off-label use.  There may 
be evidentiary difficulties with enforcing a requirement that practitioners 
refrain from inappropriate prescribing or dispensing of antibiotics.  It may 
be difficult for the government to obtain information about prescribing 
and dispensing practices, and even if it has access to that information, it 
may be difficult to demonstrate that a particular prescribing or dispensing 
decision was inappropriate.  For example, it may be difficult to prove an 
antibiotic was prescribed for a viral, rather than a bacterial, condition.  
Nevertheless, an explicit federal prohibition on inappropriate medical uses 
may carry an expressive value, and would allow the federal government to 
impose penalties in circumstances where it does possess the evidence to 
determine a use was inappropriate. 
In addition to prohibiting inappropriate prescribing and dispensing of 
antibiotics, Congress could enact legislation to directly require that 
practitioners federally report infections with antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
and undertake actions to prevent the spread of resistant infections when 
they are diagnosed.  The CDC may be the appropriate agency to implement 
and enforce such requirements because it already has a reporting system 
in place and guidelines for preventing the spread of infections, albeit of a 
voluntary nature.401 
Laws restricting prescribing, requiring practitioner reporting, or mandating 
practitioner actions to prevent the spread of infections could impose 
criminal or civil penalties on practitioners who violate the laws, including 
 
 399.  Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-144 §§ 701–718, 126 Stat. 993, 1077–82. 
 400.  21 U.S.C. § 333(e) (2012). 
 401.  See CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 32; NNDSS, supra note 382. 
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forfeiture of their state-issued licenses, similar to the CSA.402  While 
imposing such penalties on medical practitioners may seem draconian, 
serious penalties would underscore the grave public health stakes of antibiotic 
resistance.  Additionally, such penalties are already imposed on medical 
practitioners who violate existing federal laws governing medical practice.403  
Moreover, the enforcing agency could—and is likely to—exercise its 
discretion not to take action or seek the harshest penalties if the facts of a 
particular case warrant it.404 
In addition to enacting legislation to directly regulate medical practice 
that contributes to resistance, Congress could enact new legislation to 
indirectly regulate such medical practice.  For example, Congress might 
enact a law to require that hospitals—rather than practitioners—put in 
place measures to identify resistant infections and prevent their spread, 
similar to what some states have already done.405  IDSA has proposed several 
legislative changes that would indirectly control medical practice that 
contributes to resistance.  One proposal is to create a “Limited Population 
Antibacterial Drug” approval pathway, which would explicitly authorize 
the FDA to approve antibiotics based on small studies for narrow 
indications and would require labels for such antibiotics to have a logo 
and other information signaling to practitioners that the drug should be 
used in a limited fashion.406  Such labeling would encourage practitioners to 
appropriately prescribe the drugs, and may help to change standards of 
care.  IDSA has also suggested that Congress require health care settings 
to establish antibiotic stewardship programs as a condition of participation 
in Medicare and Medicaid.407 
Finally, because passing new legislation is politically challenging—and 
this may be particularly true for legislation that would regulate medical 
 
 402.  See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012); United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 190 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 403.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(e), 853 (2012). 
 404.  See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 824 (1985). 
 405.  See supra notes 385–86 and accompanying text. 
 406.  See INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOC’Y OF AM., LIMITED POPULATION ANTIBACTERIAL 
DRUG (LPAD) APPROVAL MECHANISM, available at http://www.idsociety.org/uploadedFiles/ 
IDSA/News_and_Publications/IDSA_News_Releases/2012/LPAD%20one%20pager.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/GA4H-PD2M]. 
 407.  See Infectious Diseases Soc’y of Am., Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: 
Policy Recommendations To Save Lives, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S397, S398 
tbl.1 (2011). 
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practice408—federal regulation of medical practice that contributes to 
antibiotic resistance might be most likely to occur pursuant to agencies’ 
existing authority.  IDSA has proposed that the FDA require REMS for 
antibiotics to address resistance.409  Through its REMS authority, the FDA 
could indirectly control medical practitioners by, for example, requiring 
manufacturers to educate practitioners about appropriate prescribing 
practices and infection prevention measures, or ensure that an antibiotic 
only be dispensed when there is documentation that it has been appropriately 
prescribed.410  Such documentation could be a form that requires the 
prescriber to affirm that the prescription is appropriate, the patient being 
prescribed the antibiotic has a condition consistent with a bacterial 
infection, and the dose is sufficient but not excessive.  The FDA is authorized 
to require a REMS when it is necessary to ensure that the benefits of a 
drug outweigh its risks, which are generally conceptualized as risks to the 
patient taking the drug rather than general risks to the public.411  That is, 
the risks that inappropriate antibiotic-prescribing and inadequate infection 
prevention measures pose to the public by contributing to resistance may 
not fit squarely within the statutory framework for requiring REMS.  But 
there is some precedent for the FDA to consider harms to third parties 
when requiring REMS; for example, one of the goals of the REMS for 
transmucosal immediate release fentanyl products is to “[prevent] accidental 
exposure to children and others for whom [the drugs] are not prescribed.”412 
CMS also might exercise its existing authority to indirectly regulate 
Medicare- and Medicaid-funded medical practice that contributes to 
resistance.  CMS could incentivize appropriate prescribing through its 
coverage decisions.  Such an action might be particularly important in 
 
 408.  See supra section II.B.2. 
 409.  See Derrick Gingery, Antibiotics Need REMS for Public, Not Patient, Safety 
Reasons, IDSA Says, THE PINK SHEET, Sept. 13, 2010, at 15. 
 410.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3) (2012).  The FDA has not exercised its REMS 
authority to prohibit off-label prescribing of drugs and this Article is not necessarily 
proposing that the FDA restrict all off-label uses.  To the extent that there are medically 
appropriate uses of antibiotics that are not approved, appropriate use may be a broader 
category than on-label use. 
 411.  21 U.S.C. §§ 355-1(a), (b) (2012). 
 412.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TRANSMUCOSAL IMMEDIATE RELEASE FENTANYL 
(TIRF) RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY (REMS) 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationfor
PatientsandProviders/UCM289730.pdf.  Transmucosal immediate release fentanyl products 
are opioids that are intended to manage breakthrough pain in adults with cancer who 
routinely take other opioids for pain management.  These products come in a variety of 
forms, including sublingual tablets and lozenges, that may increase the risk of accidental 
exposure to children.  See Transmucosal Immediate-Release Fentanyl (TIRF) Medicines, 
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm282110.htm [http:// 
perma.cc/S4CW-XLR9] (last updated Mar. 21, 2014). 
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light of recent research suggesting that inappropriate antibiotic use is 
widespread among Medicaid patients.413  CMS also has the authority to 
mandate that hospitals meet requirements “necessary” for “the interest of 
the health and safety of individuals who are furnished services in the 
institution” as a condition of participation in Medicare and Medicaid.414  
CMS could exercise this authority to require that participating hospitals 
establish antibiotic-prescribing and infection-prevention policies.  Although 
the first provision in the Medicare statute prohibits federal interference 
with medical practice, courts have generally rejected challenges to Medicare 
requirements on the ground that they impermissibly interfere with medical 
practice, and likewise, these requirements would likely be a permissible 
exercise of CMS’s authority.415  In sum, medical practice that contributes 
to antibiotic resistance is one appropriate target for federal action under 
the framework proposed in this Article, and there are numerous mechanisms 
through which federal oversight might be implemented. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Conventional wisdom holds that the federal government rightfully 
regulates medical products, but the states should regulate medical practice.  
Concerns about upending this division of labor have endured even in the 
face of national public health disasters caused, at least in part, by medical 
practice.  But, as this Article demonstrates, the federal government is already 
deeply entrenched in the regulation of medical practice, and possesses 
constitutional powers to continue to expand its regulatory reach.  This federal 
role in medicine, however, is inconsistently and ineffectively defined, and 
at times, obfuscated. 
This Article proposes principled criteria, which are consistent with the 
goals of federalism, for determining when a federal role is warranted.  
Instead of assigning oversight to states or the federal government based 
on whether an activity constitutes medical practice, Congress and federal 
administrative agencies should exert federal authority over medical practice 
that causes or contributes to a national public health problem that the states 
cannot address.  While this framework will be most helpful in circumstances 
in which it is very clear these criteria are satisfied—or not satisfied—
 
 413.  See Pengxiang Li et al., Factors Associated with Antimicrobial Drug Use in 
Medicaid Programs, 20 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE 829, 831 (2014). 
 414.  42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(9) (2012). 
 415.  See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text. 
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applying this framework to serious public health problems, such as antibiotic 
resistance, which do clearly satisfy the criteria will expand the options for 
addressing those problems through federal law.  Federally regulating 
medical practice, by itself, will not solve public health problems, but Congress 
and federal administrative agencies ought to consider all available regulatory 
options that are constitutionally-authorized and, consistent with federalism 
values, are ones for which the federal regulation may be advantageous. 
 
